Iraq ... The least & most deadly courses of action

Silverman/ here

"... The second most immediate problem in regards to the post-election politicking is a follow on from the first and has the potential to return Iraq to the socio-political and socio-cultural dynamics of 2005 through 2008! If Iraqqiya, which represents the tribal/traditional Sunnis and Shi’a, as well as those Sunnis and Shi’a that are more secular – all groups that have largely been locked out of Iraqi politics at the national level as a result of the Sectarian dispute, the boycott of the 2005 elections, and the failure of the Government of Iraq under PM Maliki to properly integrate the Awakening movements and the Sons of Iraq into the Iraqi Security Forces – is prohibited from trying to form the government and that privilege is instead granted to PM Maliki’s State of Law it will simply reinforce the notion that non-religious Shi’a and non-Exile movements that are not tied to Iran have little normative/legitimate influence in Iraq at the national level. Just run your cursorover the voting blocks on the chart to see that Iraqqiya got a lot of votes in places with mixed communities or larger numbers of Sunnis, while State of Law and the Iraqi National Accord got more votes in Shi’a majority and dominant areas. Moreover, and of especial concern, is what happens if State of Law and the Iraqi National Accord combine their results. If this occurs than they can pick up the smaller Lists and Parties to give themselves a comfortable majority and essentially locking everyone else out of the process.

The Most Deadly Iraqi Course of Action would be the invalidation of Iraqqiya’s winning plurality through extra-electoral manipulation followed by the formation of a Shi’a religious near majority coalition composed almost entirely of Shi’a exile groups established and supported by Iran. The Least Deadly Iraqi Course of Action, and the one that everyone who wants to see some semblance of stability come to Iraq would be Iraqqiya given the right to form the government and doing so through pursuing a broad based coalition that includes Lists and Parties from State of Law, the Iraqi National Accord, the Kurdistan Alliance and several of the smaller parties. Should Iraqqiya fail to do so, then State of Law should be given the chance, but the same type of coalition will need to be created! The Sectarian Civil War and Insurgency, which was really a resource dispute that was subsumed within the veneer of sectarian religion, the terrorism of external religious extremists, and pushback from former Ba’athists (ie not what we usually think of it as) will seem tame compared to what will happen in Iraq if the outcome of the 2010 election is resolved in anything but a transparent and legal manner."