"... Suleiman's decision is the result of US pressure ..."

OxfAn: Excerpts:

".... Today's resumption of talks signals a thaw

in internal relations that was highlighted by Prime Minister Saad al-Hariri's state visit to Damascus in December 2009. Yet it also reflects rising tensions in the region.

While the agenda includes the economy and electoral reform, the topic that will overshadow all others is a new defence strategy, and the role of Hizbollah's weapons:

• The weapons topic has been shelved since the government recognised the group's right to resistance against Israel in December. A revival of the discussion was inevitable, given its highly controversial nature.
• President Michel Suleiman's call to resume dialogue followed a February 28 report by UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon on the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1701, which ended the 2006 summer war with Israel. In the report, Ban urged Suleiman to push Lebanon's parties towards consensus on a defence strategy.
• Suleiman's decision to hold meetings may also have been the result of US pressure.

Israeli threats. National Dialogue discussions coin

cide with heightened tensions caused by an exchange of threats between Israel on the one hand and Hizbollah, Syria and Iran on the other. The tensions have (according to script) put renewed international spotlight on Hizbollah's weapons:

• ...increased its arsenal of rockets from 15,000 before the 2006 war to 40,000 today, some of which may be able to reach Tel Aviv.
• ..... Hassan Nasrallah offered a new vision of strategic parity with Israel -- an uneasy 'balance of terror' -- stressing Hizbollah's ability to strike Israel's interior.
• Nasrallah's decision to raise the stakes has provoked fears that Israel will feel forced into pre-emptive action against Lebanon, even if no conflict breaks out over Iran.
• Israeli leaders have vowed to fight 'all' of Lebanon in the event of an outbreak of conflict (that, as understood above, they will initiate!)

Nasrallah in Damascus.... The meeting conveyed two main messages:

• Washington has failed to drive a wedge between Syria and Iran, ...... immediately after the US decision to reopen its embassy in Damascus, illustrating Syria's newfound confidence and willing defiance.
• In the event of an Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear facilities, Iran's primary answer will be through Hizbollah and will therefore involve Lebanon.

Suleiman's dilemma. Nasrallah's conduct in Damascus as a 'pseudo' Lebanese minister of foreign affairs has drawn strong criticism from many March 14 leaders, who reiterate the sovereign right of Lebanon's government to decide over matters of war and peace. This puts President Suleiman in a difficult situation:

• He will be determined to ensure national unity, having from the beginning of his tenure tried to position himself centrally. The dialogue meetings could be a means to calm tensions and avert conflict, but only if Suleiman is seen as a neutral arbiter....
• He will also need to respond to international pressure on the weapons issue. He will hope that the National Dialogue gives the impression that the Lebanese state -- and not Hizbollah -- still makes decisions on war and peace.
• He must also decide on the extent of Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) cooperation with UN peacekeepers in south Lebanon. The two sides have recently performed joint manoeuvres on Mount Hermon, ostensibly designed to stem the flow of arms to Hizbollah. More extensive LAF cooperation with the UN could force a verbal confrontation with Nasrallah.

Outcomes. Hizbollah Minister of State for Administrative Reform Mohammad Fneish on March 7 said that his party's weapons will not be on the agenda, while the Christian Kata'ib Party, among others, has demanded that weapons be discussed as part of a new defence strategy. Thus, like previous National Dialogues, this week's session may fail to deliver. In reality, all parties know that:

• as Hizbollah demonstrated in the May 2008 fighting, its hand cannot be forced by any Lebanese party;
• no consensus can be reached in the current heated situation; and
• Suleiman needs to demonstrate to the West that he is doing something.

The discussions could:

• underscore the gulf between March 8 and March 14, reversing the tide of their improved relationship under the Hariri government;...

Likelihood of war. Despite the fact that Hizbollah will not disarm and Israel increasingly sees the group as an existential threat, a regional war involving Hizbollah is unlikely in the coming months:

• Having learned the lesson from the 2006 war, the group will not get easily drawn into a new conflict and will resist minor Israeli 'provocations', let alone staging military operations against Israel........it is necessary for Hizbollah to fight a defensive war, if anything at all.
• Israel cannot politically justify an unprovoked attack on Hizbollah. It may seek an excuse, thus provoking Hizbollah into small clashes, but the latter is aware of this and will seek not to respond.
• Despite belligerent rhetoric, the Israeli leadership will heed US warnings and refrain from attacking Iran before more diplomatic efforts have been exerted. If it does strike, it will do so no earlier than the autumn.

In the longer term, a clash is more likely -- whether it arises from an Israeli strike on Iran, or some other action. Hizbollah will wait until a war fits its strategic thinking, since the need to maintain domestic legitimacy at present tops its strategic agenda....."