Defeating al-Qaida in Yemen ......

OxFan: Excerpts:

Wednesday, January 6 2010

" .... Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) was formed in early 2009 from a merger of al-Qaida cells in Yemen and Saudi Arabia, when the leaders of the Yemeni movement invited Saudis, harassed by the increasingly effective government counter-terrorist campaign, to move to the more benign environment in Yemen. The current leadership of AQAP has experience of terrorist operations from Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia and Yemen.
Recent revival. The Yemeni government, with US and other Western assistance, inflicted major damage on al-Qaida in the two years after the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States. However, following the escape of several of its leaders in a mass prison break in 2006, AQAP reorganised in some of the remoter arid mountainous and desert terrain, where it has established relationships with local tribes that provide a degree of protection:

• The arrival of at least 100 Saudis, including former Guantanamo Bay detainees, has added to AQAP's strength.
• When al-Qaida based itself in similar areas from the late 1990s, the government had to use expeditionary-type military operations and air strikes to deal with them.
• There are thought to be between 200 and 400 members of AQAP in these areas, including foreigners.

Bin Laden links? AQAP leader Nasir al-Wahayshi (Abu Basir) worked with Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan in the 1990s, but there is little evidence of any current links. There have been reports of terrorists moving from Afghanistan and Iraq to Yemen, although none have been arrested or named. The evidence suggests that AQAP operates independently, though it is clearly part of the al-Qaida 'franchise'. The Nigerian bomber had been in Yemen (on a second visit) from August 2009 until just before the Christmas Day attack. He had been studying at a language school, but it appears that he was radicalised before arriving in Yemen and joined al-Qaida while there.
December 25. AQAP has claimed that the December 25 attack was in response to three significant government strikes against AQAP bases and facilities in mid-December. It was the first such strike for some time and apparently made in response to intelligence that terrorist attacks were imminent against the UK Embassy and other targets:

• Yemen claims that 24 people were killed and others arrested.
• Washington has declined to deny claims that it fired cruise missiles at these targets in support of the Yemeni action.
• Tribal sources say that many civilians were killed and an AQAP leader appeared briefly at a demonstration in protest.

It seems likely that AQAP may have been planning to attack a US passenger plane at some time but decided to bring it forward to December 25 because a bomber was available and the timing was right.
Wider capacity? AQAP's capacity to launch a sustained terrorism campaign outside Yemen is limited. When the government (with US support) destroyed much of the al-Qaida infrastructure in Yemen after the September 11 attacks, it was anxious to demonstrate to Washington that it was on the US side in the war against terrorism. Since then, a visibly weakening government has been pre-occupied by other problems. Notable among them are:

• the existential threat posed by the rebellion of Shia revivalists (al-Huthi) in Sa'dah;
• a secessionist movement in the south; and
• diminishing oil resources needed to sustain the patronage networks that support the regime and to maintain even the currently very poor level of government services.

While AQAP remains a menace to regional and international governments, it is seen in Yemen as less threatening to regime stability. Consequently, the government has devoted its limited financial, military and security capacity to what it regards as more pressings issues. The foreign minister disingenuously has said that Yemen had not been given the resources to deal adequately with AQAP by the international community.

Crackdown. The experience of the post-September 11 counter-insurgency suggests that when the regime is put under intense international pressure, combined with offers of substantial assistance, it should be able to deal with AQAP. The military side of the operation will not be easy and will require substantial external assistance. Yet it should be achievable during the next 1-2 years.
There are more intractable problems, notably potential AQAP links to Yemeni Islamic extremists and the clear links to some tribes:
1. Extremists. The regime closed down a number of religious schools after September 11, and has tried to impose greater control over the activities of some clerics, but the extremist ideologies that developed in Yemen in the 1990s (in reaction to the strength of socialism in the south) will take years to dislodge. The government has been accused of using Islamic militias in its war against the Shia revivalists in Sa'dah. There have been figures within the regime that in the past have provided some form of protection to such people, although their influence is not what it was ten years ago.
2. Tribes. Yemen's unruly tribes can be difficult to deal with but the government has much experience of using the 'carrot and stick' approach to persuade most of them either to stop protecting AQAP or push them out of their territories. It will not be as easy as in the past because the tribal tradition of offering sanctuary to fugitives has been strengthened by the way that AQAP has been recruiting members from these tribes and marrying into them.

International response. The government will welcome the international conference on security in Yemen to be held in London on January 28. As a UK government statement issued on January 5 makes clear, it and other Western governments are fully aware of the depth of Yemen's problems and recognise the potential for state failure:

• They believe that the only way to deal with AQAP is by working with and through the Yemeni government, and they seem ready to offer substantial assistance.
• They understand that they will need to help the regime tackle its economic and social problems and perhaps assist attempts at mediation in disputes with the Huthis and southern secessionists.

However, the regime knows that the West will not be able to exert too much pressure over government reform and anti-corruption measures as long as AQAP is at the top of the agenda.

Outlook. The most likely outcome of the December 25 attack will be to mobilise a joint Yemeni and international counter-terrorist campaign to fight AQAP. The Huthi and the southern secessionists will have to abandon hopes of gaining international support for their causes. The Western response is likely to strengthen the position of the regime at least on the short term -- the opposite of what AQAP wanted. Western and regional governments will have to use all their bargaining power to persuade the regime to deal with the whole range of problems it faces, not just terrorism..."