"Self-starters", a key outcome of the decline of al-Qaida?

OxfAn: Excerpts:

"US citizen David Coleman Headley's case, following closely on the arrest of US Army Major Nidal Malik Hasan over the killing of 13 people at Fort Hood in November, highlights the way 'self-starter ... who become radicalised and mount attacks essentially autonomously.

Role of 'self-starters'. Faced with both the loss of its camps and havens in Afghanistan and a long-term campaign to eliminate its leaders and block its assets, al-Qaida has lost the ability to mount coordinated and centrally-planned operations such as the September 11, 2001 attacks. Instead, it has metamorphosed from a hierarchical organisation to an inspirational force, promulgating an ideology of jihad.

While some may travel to training camps for further instruction, on the whole this ideology encourages individuals in the West to plan and carry out attacks on their own initiative. 'Self-starters' are especially important in this new phase of its operations and have been involved in almost all recent attacks.....

Numerous communities. One of the great challenges for the security forces is that 'self-starters' may come from a variety of constituencies:

1. New converts. A disproportionate number are new converts, not from traditional Muslim communities. This may make them harder for the security forces to identify. For example, one of the UK July 7 bombers was of Jamaican extraction, and one of the New York terrorists of Haitian descent.

2. Converted convicts. A particular role in many attacks has been played by those who were converted to Islam while in prison, either by other inmates or clerics deliberately proselytising within communities by definition alienated, disaffected and with fewer opportunities to be exposed to alternative theological perspectives. This 'Prislam' is often a debased, even caricatured form of Islam, but has been linked with many attacks....

3. Homeland links. Some long-standing moderate Muslims experience a radicalising epiphany and turn to jihadism, in some cases to atone for, in their eyes, having seen seduced by Western values and consumerism. A key factor has been the radicalisation of portions of the population of countries such as Pakistan and Yemen. Through family ties, sentimental attachment and proselytisation during visits home, members of migrant communities also become radicalised...

Al-Qaida flexibility? This shift to 'self-starters' is seen by some as a reflection of al-Qaida's flexibility. This view holds that its ability to adapt to a new model of attack reflects continued dynamism and ability to evolve, leveraging a number of strengths and opportunities:

• While it no longer has the network of experienced officers necessary to coordinate operations in the West, al-Qaida does retains a formidable array of communications channels through which to spread its message. These range from the internet to satellite TV. The sermons of radical preachers are made available on the internet -- for example, al-Aulaqi's were listened to by figures involved in a range of attacks, from the 'Toronto 18' to Fort Dix cases.
• It can obviously take advantage of the presence of Muslim communities in the West...

However, there are serious weaknesses to this approach. 'Self-starters' are very poor substitutes for organised attacks. The UK Contest 2 counter-terrorism strategy, released in March 2009, plausibly identifies the rise of 'self-starters' as a key outcome of the decline of the main al-Qaida organisation:

• 'Self-starters' tend to be amateurish and the overwhelming majority of attacks are either foiled or have minor impact.
• While al-Qaida can incite 'self-starters', it often does not even know who they are and appears to have little real control over them and therefore over their choice of targets.
• Attacks by home-grown terrorists alienate Muslim communities and leaders in the West who might once have implicitly or directly supported al-Qaida but who are alarmed about the consequent anti-Islamic backlash at home..."