"... Obama should move quickly to make a broad proposal on Iran’s nuclear programme & leapfrog the interim deal ...."

Clifford Kupchan, the director of Eurasia, in the FT, here

"... Right now, this would be a serious mistake; new sanctions would poison talks in which Iran’s fractured government might yet reach a “yes”. Instead, the Obama administration should move quickly to make a broad proposal on Iran’s nuclear programme and leapfrog the interim deal over which negotiations are now stuck........

The heart of the issue is whether Iran will agree to a deal on the long-term shape of its nuclear programme. To address this head-on, Washington’s offer should have two primary elements. First, Iran would have to agree to a very intrusive inspection regime, including snap inspection of all suspect sites. Tehran must assuage concerns that it possesses a network of secret facilities.

Second, Iran must agree to long-term constraints – for perhaps five years – on the amount of LEU it can stockpile. .... Smaller amounts of LEU in Iran will ease fears. Any plan to build new enrichment plants, a goal that is probably far beyond Iran’s technological ability in any case, would have to be shelved. If Iran accepted these terms, it would receive the robust array of incentives currently on offer – help with its civilian nuclear programme, trade benefits and a role in regional security.

The US should not ask that Iran suspend uranium enrichment. Tehran will refuse and the demand will kill talks. Washington should also refrain from seeking new UN sanctions until its proposal is aired. This broader approach should guide US policy for several months, but not longer. Washington must guard against Iran’s time-worn strategy of talking and stalling while continuing to develop its nuclear programme.

So far, Iran has shown little willingness to compromise. But there is a chance Tehran’s key decision-makers and constituencies could come around. On the proposal to export LEU, Iran’s ultimate decider – Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei – appeared initially to support the arrangement but then wavered. Leading conservatives attacked the offer, arguing that the west could not be trusted, as did opposition leader Mir-Hossein Moussavi. Mr Khamenei, sensing a political debacle, backed off.

That dynamic could change. First, Mr Khamenei would have to state firmly and publicly that he supports a deal – and in so doing put an end to elite debate. Second, the regime would have to prepare the Iranian elite and public for a change in nuclear policy. Third, the main pillar of the regime – the Revolutionary Guard – would at least have to acquiesce in the deal.

None of this will happen immediately. Mr Khamenei was weakened by the post-election protests and seems to have no stomach for corralling Tehran’s elite. The Guard remains very hardline on the nuclear programme. But in coming months, Mr Khamenei could decide the regime needs both the legitimacy and improved international economic relations that a deal would bring. The Guard would follow his lead – and their myriad new business interests could also lead them to seek a more benign international environment...."