(Sad) Negotiating with Iran: Reflections from Personal Experience

James Dobbins in the Washington Quarterly, here

On terrorism, Tehran had long been an opponent of both the Taliban and al Qaeda. With regards to Afghanistan, therefore, Zarif was perfectly sincere in representing Iran’s pro-democracy, anti-terrorism stance. Tehran did want to see free elections in Afghanistan, and it did want al Qaeda’s influence eliminated. Had we been ad- dressing the situations in Lebanon or Palestinian territories, U.S. and Iranian views on democracy and terrorism would be further apart. For Afghanistan, however, our objectives in this respect were similar....

Another provision eventually included in that document called for the dispatch of international peacekeepers. Neither Washington nor Tehran was enthusiastic about the creation of such a force. The Bush administration did not want to take on responsibility for peacekeeping, and the Iranian leadership did not want to see large numbers of U.S. troops next door. With the aid of my British colleague, we were able to whittle down the call for peacekeepers to a request limited geographically to the capital, Kabul.........

Finally Zarif stood up, and signaled Qanooni to join him in the corner of the room. They spoke in whispers for no more than a minute. Qanooni then returned to the table and offered to give up two ministries. He also agreed to create three new ones that could be awarded to other factions. We had a deal........

The Iranians received no private reply. Instead, they received a very public answer. One week later, in his State of the Union address, President George W. Bush named Iran, along with Iraq and North Korea, an ‘‘axis of evil.’’1 How arch-enemies Iran and Iraq could form any axis, evil or otherwise, was never explained. His remarks raised the prospect of preemptive military action against all three states to halt the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction. There was no mention whatsoever of Iran’s support for the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan. Tehran nevertheless persisted in its attempts to cooperate with the United States.......They brought with them the Iranian general, in full uniform, who had commanded their assistance mission to the Northern Alliance throughout the recent war. ‘‘My government is prepared to participate in an American-led program of support to the new Afghan army,’’ the general said. ‘‘Specifically, Iran is prepared to build barracks for and train up to 20,000 troops as part of the larger effort under your leadership.’’..........

It was only several years later, on reading the memoirs of former director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), George Tenet, that I learned that two Department of Defense (DOD) members of my team in Bonn had left in the midst of our negotiations to attend a clandestine meeting in Rome with people whom Tenet characterized as ‘‘violent’’ opponents of the Iranian regime............

Not yet dissuaded, Tehran made another effort to engage the Bush administration a year later. This approach was more formal and far-reaching, encompassing offers of cooperation on nuclear technology, Iraq, terrorism, and Middle East peace as well as Afghanistan. The Iranian offer was conveyed though the Swiss government, which was responsible for representing U.S. interests in Tehran. This proposal, like its predecessor, was never seriously considered in Washington and once again the Iranians never received a response.........

'The Road not taken!'

Obama has said that he is not willing to negotiate indefinitely and that if Iran does not move soon on the central issues of its nuclear program, the United States will seek additional sanctions. This is a false dichotomy. Sanctions and negotiations are not alternatives, and there is no reason for the United States to deny itself one means of influencing Iran because it is employing another ..."