"Missing exit strategy" ... again.

[OXFAN: Excerpts]

"....

Key characteristics. The extended review has exhibited three key features:

1. Strategic overview. Meetings have involved a broad strategic overview: a general background to the current state of affairs in AFPAK, the stability of Pakistan and effects of drone strikes, options for US troop increases, the prospects for a 'civilian surge' of diplomats and aid workers, estimates for training Afghan forces, and the long-term effect on the US military of alternative strategies.

2. Military approach stressed. The discussions have emphasised US military force levels and how and where they would be employed. Other approaches that focus on diplomacy, regional players, international organisations and the role of Afghan government have received relatively little attention. The dominance of the US military in the discussions was the subject of a complaint by US Ambassador to Afghanistan Karl Eikenberry, who suggested an alternative civilian approach putting the State Department and the US Agency for International Development in the lead -- but there is no evidence that his proposal has gained any backing.

3. Afghan government marginalised. Deep distrust of Afghan President Hamid Karzai's government is evident, although all the options discussed require a friendly 'host nation' partner. Traditional Western counter-insurgency strategies require that a foreign force support a perceived 'legitimate' government, though this has been replaced in the current debate by unofficially acknowledging the corruption of the Afghan government, and hoping instead to develop partnerships with provincial governments, tribal structures and militias. This approach suggests that while Washington still supports building up certain ministries within the Afghan government, particularly the armed forces, it may simultaneously try to distance itself from Karzai.

Course of debate. The timing of the review suggests that Obama was dissatisfied both with the results of the strategy he announced in March, and sceptical about the cost and utility of the increase in US military forces requested by the top US commander in Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal....

Missing exit strategy. There has been little emphasis on re-evaluating fundamental assumptions during the course of the debate. In contrast, considerable attention has been paid to finding a middle ground (described by some officials as a counter-insurgency plan for the cities and a counter-terrorism plan for the countryside) -- although this has satisfied neither side, and there are doubts about whether it creates a reasonable chance of 'success'.

None of the options presented provide any indication as to when demonstrable progress could be achieved to the point where US forces could withdraw -- although results should have been forthcoming after the scenarios were war-gamed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in October. However, at a November 11 meeting, Obama insisted that planners revise the options to include various exit-strategies, as a precondition for publicly announcing the new strategy ..."