“Fixing Broken Windows: Security Sector Reform in ...Lebanon..."

Part of a Carnegie Papers report, here

[...]

"... Despite the departure of Syrian troops in April 2005, the sector continues “to suffer command and organizational weaknesses due to the pull of political, sectarian, and regional loyalties,” and various services report to different constitutional authorities.10 This undermines the formulation of policies and sector-wide planning, erodes operational command, and impedes modernization and the upgrade of skills and equipment. 

The sectarian and political struggle for control over the security sector is compounded by the presence of dual military forces in Lebanon resulting from the exemption of Hizbollah from the disarming and disbanding of the militias in the early 1990s.  This duality, in turn, complicates reform and restructuring. The effects were highlighted by the crisis of May 2008, during which the Lebanese opposition, spearheaded by Hizbollah, took control of the western half of the capital, Beirut. The Higher Defense Council and Central Security Council were paralyzed, and the Lebanese Armed Forces and Internal Security Forces remained on the sidelines for fear of splintering yet again, as they did during the long civil war. 

The United States and the European Union face a particular dilemma. The Lebanese security sector is underresourced and underequipped, but material assistance is of limited value so long as the political authorities are unprepared to devise national security policies. Reform is not possible without a single “address” to engage with, and so long as the security sector is regarded by any of the key actors—both internal and external—as a tool of regime protection or of gaining the upper hand militarily against Hizbollah and the opposition. 

Consequently, the United States and the European Union have tacitly accepted that it is impractical to pursue security sector reform or devise a national security policy in Lebanon, while not disengaging altogether. The result is a low- key affair, consisting mainly of bilateral efforts focusing largely on improving basic skills and armament in select areas and services, reflecting the absence of an integrated framework and ambivalence about aims and methods. 

The United States 

The United States immediately welcomed the departure of Syrian troops from Lebanon, but was considerably slower to realize the need for Lebanese security sector reform. Its initial response was to dispatch a planning mission headed by Brig. General Mark Kimmitt in early 2006 to assess the condition of previously supplied U.S. weapons and equipment, and to evaluate Lebanese Armed Forces needs accordingly. ....... Kimmit expressed the purpose succinctly: “In our minds, this is the army that sooner or later will have to stand up to the armed branch of Hizbollah.”

This objective explains both the priorities of U.S. policy toward the Lebanese security sector, and its inconsistency. The United States reversed its approach following the summer 2006 war between Hizbollah and Israel. The war led to the perception that the Lebanese Armed Forces, and especially its G2 branch (Military Intelligence), were closely associated with Hizbollah and that its rank and file were heavily Shi’i Muslim and so presumably sympathetic to the organization. The result was a shift of focus toward the Internal Security Forces, reflecting the belief that it was a progovernment bastion and that its own intelligence agency, the Information Section, was loyal to the largely Sunni Muslim Future Movement, headed by Sa’d Hariri,..... The United States supplied the Lebanese Armed Forces with arms and munitions during its bitter battle against the Fatah–Islam group in the Palestinian refugee camp of Nahr al-Bared in May–September 2007, but basic American policy did not change. Only after the Internal Security Forces failed to intervene against the opposition during the street battles of May 2008 did the United States seek to restore full working relations with the Lebanese Armed Forces, dispatching two military delegations to visit the army command and delivering new shipments of ammunition and light vehicles afterwards. Nonetheless, American security assistance has remained limited and hesitant. The Internal Security Forces received increased training and equipment in 2006–2008, mainly destined for border control and the Information Section, ....... Nonetheless, less than half the original $410 million in security assistance pledged in 2006 had been delivered by the end of 2008 due to wrangling between the U.S. Departments of State and Defense. 

(continue, here)