Thursday, October 22, 2009

Turkey & the Race For Iran


In the Leveretts' Race For Iran, here

"We have spent the last few days in Turkey, attending the inaugural meeting of the Istanbul Forum, a conference on political and security challenges in the Middle East organized by the German Marshall Fund, the Foundation for Political, Economic, and Social Research, and the strategic communications division of Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP). The conference brought together Turkish, Middle Eastern, European, and American participants for discussions on a wide range of regional political and security issues. The conference also afforded us a wonderful opportunity to take a look at Turkey’s expanding role in the Middle East – especially regarding Iran.

In his opening address to the Forum, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan described Turkey’s “zero problems” policy vis-à-vis its neighbors – in Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Europe, as well as in the Middle East. Focusing in on the Middle East, Erdogan’s chief foreign policy adviser explained to us that Turkey’s approach to the region is based on four principles: engage all actors, respect the results of all democratic elections (including those in Palestine in 2006 and Iran in 2009), increase cultural and economic relations among countries in the region, and work with regional and international organizations to maximize possibilities for engagement. Working from these principles, Turkey has in recent years effected major improvements in its relations with Iraq and Syria as well as with the Islamic Republic. At the same time, Ankara has developed ties to Hamas and Hizballah.

Taken together, these steps have made Turkey an increasingly important player across a wide spectrum of regional issues. This has served Turkish interests well. Expanding trade and investment links with Iran, Iraq, and Syria has boosted the growth of Turkey’s economy – one of the more decidedly non-rentier economies in the greater Middle East. Furthermore, Turkey’s ties to an expanding range of important actors in the region give Turkey’s current government a wider range of strategic options. This has been demonstrated in the current government’s sharply critical reaction to the Israeli military campaign in Gaza – including Erdogan’s highly publicized walkout from a joint event with Israeli President Shimon Peres at the World Economic Forum and the postponement of NATO military exercises in Turkey that were supposed to include Israeli participation.

Israelis and some of Israel’s friends in the United States decry what they see as the expansion of Turkey’s ties to other important Middle Eastern states at the expense of Turkey’s ties to Israel. But such criticism reflects obliviousness to an important reality – namely, at this point, Israel needs a relationship with Turkey more than Turkey needs a relationship with Israel.

With regard to Iran, Turkey’s expanding ties to the Islamic Republic – including gas supply contracts and a number of “MOUs” and other preliminary agreements for major upstream and pipeline investment projects – are critical to Ankara’s plans to consolidate a role as the leading transit “hub” for oil and gas supplies to Europe. These ties are just as significant for Tehran, and are likely to be an important channel through which the Islamic Republic can move into a larger role as an energy supplier to European markets.

However much Ambassador Richard Morningstar and other Obama Administration officials resist admitting it, the Nabucco pipeline will almost certainly not be commercially viable in the long run without the inclusion of Iranian gas volumes in the project. Ankara will give the Obama Administration perhaps a year to show more effective leadership than the George W. Bush Administration displayed in getting Turkmenistan to commit substantial gas volumes for export across the Caspian Sea to Turkey. If such leadership is not forthcoming – and it is hard to see the Obama Administration really “delivering” on this point – Turkey will very likely move ahead and conclude significant upstream and pipeline investment contracts in Iran over the next several years. This is something that would be strongly in Turkey’s interest. If American policymakers are smart, they would see Turkey’s ties to important Middle Eastern actors like Iran as an asset for the United States and its allies in the region.

Turkey has emerged as an exceptionally interesting entrant in the race for Iran. We plan to revisit the evolution of Turkish-Iranian relations periodically as we move ahead with this blog."

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