"A different regime change in Iran"

R Haass in the FT/ here

"...... Such a strike would at best delay the Iranian programme: it is impossible to destroy what is unknown, and it is not always possible to destroy what is known if the target is well-shielded. An attack would also trigger extensive Iranian retaliation in Iraq and Afghanistan. The oil price could triple to more than $200 a barrel in a matter of hours, choking off global economic recovery.....

One alternative to a military strike would be to live with an Iranian programme. Deterrence would define such a policy. Iran would need to know that any use of nuclear weapons would meet a devastating response. It should know, too, that handing over nuclear materials to any terrorist group, such as Hamas or Hizbollah, would be discovered (given the growing expertise in nuclear forensics) and deemed no different than an Iranian use of the material. Intelligence that Iran had put its nuclear forces on alert would be met with a pre-emptive attack on those forces.

It is likely, but not certain, that this would be sufficient to deter Iran’s leaders.....

It is obvious that preventive military action and deterrence both have important drawbacks. It would be better to persuade Iran through a mix of incentives and sanctions to limit what it does in the nuclear realm....... If Iran is sincere about being willing to reassure the international community about its nuclear activities, fine. If not, new sanctions should be introduced that target assets owned by the 125,000-strong Revolutionary Guard (who just acquired a majority share of the country’s telecommunications company), and the oil and gas sector so central to Iran’s economy. Russian and Chinese support (and United Nations endorsement) should be viewed as desirable but not essential......The Iranian regime should be forced to explain to its own people just why it is willing to pay so much for nuclear weapons and suffer economic sanctions that increase the misery of the average Iranian.

The objective is to increase pressure on the Revolutionary Guard from below. Such pressure could lead to an improved policy on nuclear matters. Or, better yet, it could over time help change the regime, to one based on a more reasonable coalition of clerics, reformers, the traditional military and ordinary citizens. Such a regime might still hold a nuclear option, but its character would provide us with some grounds for comfort."