Iraq’s New Battlefront: The Struggle over Ninewa

ICG Report/ here

... RECOMMENDATIONS,,,

To the Government of Iraq and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG):

5.  Take steps to resolve bilateral issues, including:

a) stepping up negotiations on disputed territories, power sharing and constitutional reform, security and the role of peshmergas and oil/gas; and

b) holding discussions on disputed territories as part of the task force established under UN auspices and instituting confidence-building steps in individual districts, as per the recommendations of the UN mission (UNAMI) in its April 2009 report on disputed internal boundaries.

6.  Avoid inflammatory rhetoric concerning mutual relations, the status of disputed territories and the issuance of oil and gas contracts in these areas, especially in the run-up to the January 2010 legislative elections.

7.  Pressure Ninewa political actors, notably al-Hadbaa and the Ninewa Brotherhood List, to reach agreement on a power-sharing formula and security arrangements as described below and pledge to release $500 million in unspent past budget funds to the local government if a deal is reached.

8.  Seek to minimise security risks by:

a) refraining from military manoeuvres in disputed territories without pre-notifying the other side;

b) integrating Kurdish peshmergas in Ninewa into federal army units deployed in disputed districts and appointing peshmerga commanders to senior positions in these units alongside non-Kurdish commanders; and

c) deploying such joint army-peshmerga units at checkpoints and in patrols in disputed territories, to be overseen by a joint security committee comprising political representatives of the KRG, the Ninewa government and the federal government......

To the U.S. Government:

11.  Assist relevant Iraqi parties to reach the necessary compromises in Ninewa, in particular by:

a) pressing the Iraqi government to reintegrate certain members of the Baath party and the insurgency in local civilian and security institutions;

b) pressuring local allies that rely heavily on the U.S., notably tribal forces, to promote a power- and security-sharing agreement; and

c) insisting on the necessary protection of minority groups.

12.  Consider seriously adding U.S. military officers to joint Arab-Kurdish patrols as a transitional confidence-building measure to improve communication, coordination and cooperation.