"... the Administration's hesitancy to enter the Iraq-Syria fray is being driven, at least in part, by its determination not to offend Assad..."

WINEP's John Hannah takes the baton from David Schenker, here

"...... the United States has a huge stake in supporting the Iraqi government's efforts to pressure Syria out of the terrorism game.....

Remarkably, as tensions escalated between Baghdad and Damascus, the United States had almost nothing to say. The one exception came on August 26, when the State Department spokesman was asked about the deteriorating situation. Reading from prepared guidance, he replied:

'... it's an internal matter for both -- for the Iraqi government and the Syrian government.... We hope this doesn't hinder dialogue between the two countries.'

An internal matter? .... Syria is a brutal anti-American dictatorship ..... true that Syria has in recent years conducted a harsh crackdown on Islamic extremists -- but only those who refuse to play by SMI's rules and stubbornly insist on targeting the Syrian regime in addition to that of Iraq.

Knowing all this, and bearing in mind all the United States has at stake in Iraq's success, how can the Obama administration adopt the posture of a disinterested bystander in this conflict?  And the U.S. remains on the sidelines? What message does that send about U.S. resolve to stand by allies who are under terrorist attack? what lessons will be drawn by others who look to Washington for support and reassurance against aggressive tyrants?

Even if the United States can't confirm Maliki's claims about Syria's responsibility for the August 19 bombings, it could still easily craft a statement that makes clear whose side it stands on in light of Syria's violent legacy in Iraq. Something along the lines of: "While we are working closely with Iraq to determine exactly who perpetrated these specific attacks, the United States has longstanding concerns about Syria's role ...... Syria must be made to choose: It can become part of the solution in Iraq, or it can remain a major part of the problem. It cannot be both." 

Though U.S. officials privately acknowledge that there has been little meaningful change in Syria's policies on Lebanon, Palestine, or Iraq, President Obama seems personally committed to wooing Assad. Rumors have circulated of a recent Obama letter underscoring his desire for improved U.S.-Syrian relations. Uppermost in the president's mind is said to be the goal of re-convening direct peace talks between Israel and Syria after an almost decade-long hiatus. It's easy to imagine, therefore, that the administration's hesitancy to enter the Iraq-Syria fray is being driven, at least in part, by its determination not to offend Assad and put at risk the chances for this kind of perceived diplomatic breakthrough....

When it comes to anti-American dictatorships in general, and Syria in particular, history suggests that leverage and pressure, not reassurance and unconditional concessions, are the most reliable ways to ensure that diplomatic engagement advances U.S. goals. It's a lesson the Obama administration would do well to heed."