"..... Arguably one of the most significant turning points can be attributed to an astonishing shift in the allegiances of the PSP leader, Walid Jumblatt, on 2 August – from seemingly being Syria's arch-enemy in Lebanon to heading back into the Damascene fold. The ramifications of Jumblatt's departure from the (Saudi and US-backed) March 14 alliance continue to send tremors through the country's fragile political system....
His defection is evidence of the death of the Bush conceptual framework for the Middle East that divided the area into "moderates" and "extremists". The battle lines were drawn between a US-supported alliance of Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states, Jordan, Egypt, Fatah Palestinians and the Lebanese March 14 alliance .... Previously Jumblatt decided to side with the aggressive new US neocon administration....
Yet the wave of change promised by Bush's interventions in the Middle East crashed on the bloody rocks and rubble of Iraq, leaving Lebanon increasingly isolated........... a reminder that the US was a part-time player in the Lebanon arena, whereas it is the Syrians who have the long game....
What is more, a series of crucial events occurred during the Hezbollah takeover of the Beirut streets last year. ......In the battle that followed, anti-aircraft guns and RPGs were used and dozens were killed on both sides, leading the combatants' respective leaders into an emergency dialogue to prevent a battle escalating into a war.
Ultimately the incident exposed Jumblatt and the Druze's vulnerability. ..... the prospect of taking on Lebanon's dominant military force (Hezbollah) in open conflict was a bridge too far when combined with the changing winds of international policy....."
1 comment:
The battles did not really take place in Beirut but in the suburbs and in selected areas of the Chouf. The battle in Beirut was quick and surgical. The death of few citizens, regrettably came after all was said and done. Amal's militia goons were responsible.
The swiftness of Hezbollah's control of Beirut and the roads leading to Jumblat's stronghold sent a clear message to the druze warlord that he could not match the organized and disciplined forces of the Hezb. He understood that very quickly, in fact about half an hour after the battle for the control of Beirut had started. Ever since, he started the long and arduous road of realigning himself politically. He understood three things: one, is that the so-called sunni militia armed by Hariri was ineffectual; two, that the Americans were not going to open a new front in hostile Lebanon and would not sent their men and women die for the supremacy of local chieftains; three, that Israel would be delighted to see a general community massacres taking place in Lebanon. All his actions are geared to protect the druzes.
Armchair strategists and warmongers need to review their perspective on things in Lebanon!
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