...When Blair told the Commons that he hoped conflict with Iraq could be averted, he already knew the White House had picked 1,500 targets...

In the Observer, here

"... It is precisely such gaps between the private and public versions of events that, many believe, would be exposed by an open inquiry into the Iraq war. ...

"The original genius of the Security Council resolution in November 2002 was that it charged Saddam to prove his innocence: then, by becoming obsessed with finding a smoking gun or getting him to do something loony like shoot down a drone [the plan changed]. People suddenly realised that they had to prove him guilty. The onus of proof shifted, which was a serious own goal."...

Allied planes already patrolling the existing no-fly zone were coming under increasing threat of being shot down. Did this give Bush his idea? For the Americans, it was clear that time was running out. Two days before the 31 January meeting, Bush used his annual State of the Union address to prepare his nation for war.... Blair needed the resolution to win over not only the British public, but parliament and wavering cabinet ministers such as Robin Cook and Clare Short. He was also due to face the wrath of the grassroots at Labour's spring conference in mid-February, the same weekend as the planned Stop the War march.

Against this background, the two-hour meeting on 31 January in Bush's private apartments at the White House - involving the two men and six senior officials - was critical. The British press were briefed that their prime minister would push the need for a UN mandate, for the sake of domestic and international opinion. That much is borne out by the memo, which has Blair suggesting a second resolution would provide "an insurance policy".

US journalists, meanwhile, were told the two men would discuss a timetable for war if no second resolution materialised. Behind closed doors, the memo confirms that the Americans had virtually given up on that resolution and were clutching at increasingly improbable straws, from encouraging Iraqi defections to assassination.

Past accounts from senior members of both administrations have suggested Blair exacted generous concessions from Bush at this meeting. The Manning memo seems to portray Bush as the driving force, while Blair is recorded reassuring the Americans that he was "solidly with the President and ready to do whatever it took to disarm Saddam".

Blair is widely thought to have tried at this meeting to get the invasion delayed until April. But the memo reveals there was little chance of that;..."

Viewed from the White House, the furore may seem odd. Barack Obama's administration is untainted by Iraq; it has little to fear and may even benefit from an inquiry exploring a previous Republican administration's murkiest hours. By contrast, Brown sat in Blair's war cabinet, a little too close for comfort..."