What does Tehran want?

ICG Report, here

"... A new chapter fleetingly appeared possible in the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 attacks. .....America’s subsequent response confounded and scarred the regime. From partner in the war against the Taliban, Iran suddenly became one of Washington’s prime targets. A U.S. analyst said:

From Iran’s per­spective, it was the ultimate reversal and betrayal. Tehran had worked with America to get rid of a dangerous adversary. Then, without warning, Washington turned around, branded it a member of [what President Bush called] “the axis of evil”. In the meantime, the U.S. closed ranks with a country, Pakistan, that did precisely what Washington accused Iran of wishing to do: acquire a nuclear bomb, harbour terrorists and provide support to militants in a neighbouring country, Afghanistan.

... A senior official said, “an attack on Iran will condemn the region to more confusion and more risks. ...”.

Of all the justifications the regime could invoke to pursue its nuclear program, those provided by the Americans were the most effective by far. Aside from Iran, two countries belonged to Bush’s “axis of evil”: Iraq and North Korea. The former did not possess a nuclear weapon; the latter did. Iraq was invaded, its regime overthrown, its territory occupied. Meanwhile, the U.S. is seeking to negotiate with North Korea. What conclusions do you think the Iranian regime would have drawn from this?...

what does iran want?

Seen from Tehran, changes in U.S. rhetoric and attitude are important but both insufficient and insufficiently clear. Officials and analysts with close ties to the regime assert these are born of necessity – namely, growing recognition in Washington of its predicament in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere – rather than of a new strategic vision. They suspect that the administration is proposing a series of tactical arrangements    aimed at rescuing its damaged posture in those arenas but not a fundamentally new relationship or partnership. Conversely, as Ali Larijani, the powerful speaker of parliament, said, “if Iran feels that the U.S. wishes to resolve regional problems, if it feels that America’s shift is strategic rather than tactical and if talks could help the region’s vital interests, then Iran could take a close look at the proposal”.

An analyst explained:

The Bush administration’s wars – toppling the Taliban and Saddam Hussein – are rich in irony from our standpoint. The U.S. was compelled to eliminate regimes that had been their objective allies in efforts to contain Iran. America spent as much militarily and financially in overthrowing these regimes as they had in creating them. This new situation forces the U.S. to find a new regional posture, but it is not enough to define a new relationship with Iran. Washington faces its failure and is in the position of demandeur. It realises Iran’s importance and its own strategic fiasco. But does it really have an alternative strategy in mind for its relationship with Iran?

 Iran’s Expectation: A Fundamental Shift in U.S. Perceptions

Tehran’s most oft-repeated, basic demand also is its most abstract: that the U.S. change the way it sees and treats Iran, its regional role and aspirations. Because it is hard to define and generally devoid of a tangible dimension – what exactly would it mean for Washington to acknowledge Iran’s regional influence and role? – the request often is dismissed as mere rhetoric. That is a mistake.

Kazem Sajjadpour, vice president of the School of International Relations, which is affiliated with the foreign ministry, put it this way:

Any positive ini­tiative must be founded on a new understanding of Iran, in other words on relinquishing the tenets on which the West up until now has built its approach. This is not a matter of misunderstanding but of an utter lack of understanding, of intellectual laziness. The West sees Iran exclusively as a threatening power. It has built an entire industry on the basis of such fear and on its promotion. The first issue to tackle is to correctly answer two fundamental questions: what is Iran and what does it want? 

From the regime’s perspective, dialogue, in other words, is not enough. It can take place; indeed it already has: that was the model of the three rounds of Iraq-related negotiations and, earlier, of the talks on Afghanistan. Another analyst, Khalil Shirgholami, researcher at the Centre for Euro-American Studies of the Institute for Political and International Studies, described them as follows:

“Washington simply asked us to take specific steps without seeking to understand Iran’s overall position, as if it were possible to isolate the things we can do to help the U.S. from Iran’s broader regional role. For us, that kind of dialogue symbolises the unequal relationship the U.S. has sought to impose under cover of mutual respect. Iran was invited to participate only to the extent it had something to offer to the U.S. – not because it had something to say.

In the absence of reci­­procity and treatment of Iran as a full-fledged regional actor, officials assert, engage­ment cannot achieve durable results. Worse, as they experienced with the Afghan precedent, it might not even shield Tehran from a sudden reversal in U.S. policy. In a senior official’s words, “Iran has nothing to gain from a pseudo-dialogue. We could sit forever around a table but nothing will come of it if the U.S. chooses to ignore our point of view, doubts and interests. You can’t have a productive dialogue whileinsulting and seeking to destabilise us”

(Continue reading this excellent report, here)