“We do not believe that Israel will embark on the development of nuclear weapons with the aim of actually starting a nuclear war,”

Walter Pincus in the CSM, here

"... the declassified 48-year-old CIA Special National Intelligence Estimate, continues “Possession of a nuclear weapon capability, or even the prospect of achieving it, would clearly give Israel a greater sense of security, self-confidence and assertiveness.” ...

Does the understanding of why a friendly country seeks a nuclear weapon apply when the analysis involves two countries that are potential U.S. enemies? No, is the safe bet when public reaction is considered.

But shouldn’t intelligence analysts recognize that friends - and potential foes - may have similar reasoning for nuclear ambitions: to deter potential invaders and to promote their standing among allies and enemies alike? Wouldn’t that be worth understanding even in unpredictable and potentially unstable governments? It might when trying to talk them out of it - though it has to be noted that it didn’t help with Israel, a stable ally....

In another ironic twist, the estimate said Israel’s enemy, the UAR (United Arab Republic, the then-combination of Egypt and Syria) “as a last desperate resort … might try to destroy the Israeli program through preventive military action.”

U.S. military experts today have argued that any Israeli attempt to knock out Iran’s nuclear program would fail and create havoc. Back in 1960, American intelligence analysts believed that the main Arab leader attempting such an effort against Israel also would have been counterproductive. “Given present relative military capabilities,” the estimate said, Gen. Gamal Abdel Nasser, UAR president, “would almost certainly realize that such military action would precipitate a war which he is likely to lose.”