OXFAN: "Netanyahu foreign policy speech shifts onus"

OXFAN: Excerpts:

".... Contrary to his election rhetoric, Netanyahu entered office without a clearly formulated approach to the peace process.... the issue was forced upon him by his own foreign minister, Avigdor Lieberman's declaration that Israel was no longer bound by the Annapolis process,...

....in Washington in May, he hoped that he could divert attention away from the Palestinian issue by focusing conversation on the Iranian nuclear threat. However, he was told in no uncertain terms that:

• he had not recognised that change had come to Washington;
• the administration wanted to open new avenues of diplomacy that had been closed by the Bush administration; and
• any untoward obduracy on Israel's part would be taken as a challenge to Obama's authority as the new US president.

... After Obama's Cairo speech, Netanyahu's aides interpreted his words to mean that henceforth Washington would no longer merely mediate between the two sides but, in line with Abbas's demands, would also make public judgments on the value of Israel's words and actions. In effect, instead of Netanyahu and Abbas 'passing the ball' between each other, Netanyahu would be expected to send it to Washington first to see if it satisfied US wishes, after which it might then be sent on to the other side for consideration. 

This perception added to Israeli concerns that the Palestinians were conducting the peace talks asymmetrically in order to gain advantage:

• Analysis of the previous negotiations suggested a pattern in the manner in which the Palestinians negotiated.
• The two sides would come close to an agreement on an issue, and then, according to the analysis, the Palestinians would use that near-agreement as a means to up their demands.
• Israel was then expected to add more concessions without any additional Palestinian quid pro quo.

Speech strategy. Netanyahu's speech and the leaks that preceded it were based on both this analysis and the interpretation of Washington's approach that Netanyahu's office had come to:

• If Washington wanted to be judge, then the Israelis would demand parallelism at each stage of the negotiations.
• If Washington wanted Israel to reiterate a previous government's commitment to the road map, Israel would demand that the Palestinians reiterate a commitment made by Fatah in the 1980s to accept the original UN partition plan in resolution 181 that had called for an 'Arab state' and a 'Jewish state'.

At the same time, Netanyahu, using polls as a guide, set about ensuring Israeli public support:

• Netanyahu structured the speech in such a way that, in essence, it demanded parallelism on the part of the Palestinians. If Obama had supported the concept of a Jewish state, just as he had supported a two-state solution, the Palestinians would have to do the same...
• By focusing prior attention on whether he would mention "two states" Netanyahu was able to highlight this and his demand for a parallel Palestinian response accepting Israel as a Jewish state and to ignore the more concrete and tough issue Obama had raised -- freezing all settlement activity.
• Great escape. The immediate Palestinian reaction was even more virulent than the Israelis had expected -- and was thus particularly welcomed by Netanyahu's aides. 
•  Netanyahu would have been under immediate pressure to deal with the demand for a settlement freeze. Instead, he was able to sigh with relief that not only had domestic opposition been muffled, but also that the onus placed on him by the Cairo speech had appeared to lift, at least for the moment -- and possibly for longer depending on events in Iran. .."