"Why Syria fuels the Iraqi insurgency"

This idiotic writer is actually suggesting that Iraq use its own citizens-refugees (in Syria) as pawns to get Damascus' cooperation on security issues! WINEP's Tanter writing this for this Daily Star

".....For two years, Syrian security personnel facilitated the activities of foreign jihadists and Saddam loyalists with the implicit approval of Damascus. The regime had two major incentives in doing so.

First, in the same way that Saudi Arabia disposed of its most fervent jihadists by sending them to Afghanistan during the 1980s to fight and die against the Soviet Union, Iraq was a fortuitous outlet for Syria's own Islamist opposition, based mainly in and around Aleppo, in the country's northwest corner. The strategy was, at best, a short-term success. Syria will now be forced to contend with battle-hardened jihadists returning from Iraq. Saudi Arabia experienced a similar "blowback" when it struggled to "digest" returning Saudis from the Afghanistan war.

Second, Syria had a strategic interest in tying down US forces in Iraq and preventing the rise of a stable Iraqi government allied with the United States. Despite the significant animosity that existed between Damascus and Saddam's Iraq, the regime in Damascus determined that chaos in Iraq was preferable to the rise of a stable US ally to Syria's east.

Improvements in Iraqi security since 2007 are the result of developments on the Iraqi side of the Syrian border,..... Iranian dissidents in Iraq also acted as mediators between Iraqi Sunni chiefs and the Coalition forces to help stabilize the country.

Contrary to Syrian claims, the stability in Iraq has very little to do with the cooperation Damascus has offered (as minimal as that happens to be)....

Looking forward, President Barack Obama will need a multi-pronged strategy of focusing on Iraqi security, occasional covert operations across the border against high-value targets in Syria, and outreach to Damascus. However, expectations should be tempered. Even at the height of US leverage in the aftermath of the assassination of former Lebanese Premier Rafik Hariri in Lebanon, Syria was unwilling to undertake serious efforts to curtail the activities of jihadists and insurgents on its soil.

Ultimately, the Iraqi government may eventually have more influence over Damascus, given Syria's desire to expand economic relations between the two countries. ...., topping Syria's agenda was the signing of agreements related to economy and oil, which Damascus believed should precede agreements on security issues. Syria also seeks relief from the economic stress of its Iraqi refugees. According to December 2006 statistics from the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, there are between 600,000 and 1 million Iraqi refugees in Syria. Iraq has a unique opportunity to ensure that its security demands are met before moving forward with Syria on those issues that are critical to the Syrian economy.

What may ultimately doom the jihadist and Baathist operatives in Syria is the domestic headache they give Damascus. Just as Saudi Arabia suffered the blowback effects of jihadists returning from Afghanistan in the 1980s, a new generation of foreign fighters driven out of Iraq may yet challenge the Syrian regime.

However, the Islamist opposition has been down that road before...."