US Intelligence Assessment on the Iranian Nuclear Issue

In the PULSE, here

"...if a dialogue of substance develops between the American administration and Iran, the (new) intelligence estimate may serve to create a feeling within the administration that time is not of the essence, and that at this stage there is no need to limit the time period of the dialogue if it seems that this option can be productive.

"In the February 2009, the American intelligence community published the unclassified portion of the intelligence assessment regarding threats directed against the United States, ... The new intelligence assessment does not differ in essence from the December 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on the Iranian issue, which sparked much criticism in Israel and the United States for downplaying the nuclear question. However, the emphases of the new report differ in part from those of the preceding one.

The new intelligence report is in part similar to the 2007 estimate:

1. The new assessment repeats the previous finding that in 2003 Iran froze its military nuclear program, which included attempts at converting fissile materials into weapons, clandestine uranium conversions, and other activities connected to the process of enriching uranium. The new report determines that this freeze lasted at least until the middle of 2007, and that there is no information indicating that the program was resumed. American intelligence does not have enough information to determine with certainty if Iran is prepared to continue the freeze on its military nuclear program.

2. The new assessment also allows a measure of doubt as to whether Iran has made a final decision on producing nuclear weapons. Thus, it determines that the American intelligence community does not know if Iran intends to produce nuclear weapons, and notes twice that "Iran could develop nuclear weapons" should it decide to do so.

3. Similar to the 2007 report, the new assessment also notes that Iran retains the option to develop nuclear weapons, and that it possesses the technological infrastructure that would allow it to develop nuclear weapons.

4. The timetable involved in Iran obtaining nuclear weapons has not changed. According to the assessment, Iran will be able to produce high quality enriched uranium in quantities sufficient for nuclear weapons between 2010 and 2015 (though according to assessment of the US State Department research units, not before 2013).

Nevertheless, the new report treats the risk of Iran obtaining nuclear weapons with greater gravity than the previous report in two ways:

1. The new assessment particularly emphasizes that Iran is making significant progress in at least two of the areas relevant to producing nuclear weapons: enriching uranium, which would allow the production of fissile material to produce nuclear weapons, and manufacturing and improving ballistic missiles as launching vehicles capable of carrying a nuclear payload. Whereas the 2007 report placed its emphasis on the freezing of the Iranian program, the new assessment focuses on the progress made in these two areas.

2. The new report estimates that Iran seems to have succeeded in importing some fissile material, though not in quantities sufficient to produce nuclear weapons. The report does not rule out the possibility that Iran has either already obtained or will at some future point obtain nuclear weapons or fissile material in sufficient quantities for nuclear weapons from abroad. However, according to the American intelligence assessment, Iran today does not have nuclear weapons, and to date has not obtained fissile material in quantities sufficient to produce nuclear weapons. In this sense, the assessment does not support the statement by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen, who at the end of February claimed that Iran has enough fissile material to produce a bomb...."