"Ross: 'Iranian nuclear program is not the sole nor even the most important reason for quick US action...'

[Excerpts]: March 24, 2009

Middle East Special Envoy George Mitchell is arranging office space and hiring personnel, awaiting formation of a new Israeli government. Iraqi policy is as one State Department official puts it, "on auto-pilot" as the clock winds down on US military involvement. Only on Iran has the Administration begun to make decisions and take substantive steps to implement a new policy.
Under the direction of Dennis Ross, Secretary Clinton's top advisor on Iran, a new team has been assembled, given office space [Mitchell's old digs, on the heavily traveled first floor corridor] but most important begun planning and orchestrating a series of moves that have already shaped the scope and direction of US policy towards Iran.
To begin with, Ross' team [which includes a full compliment of experts, ranging from intelligence personnel to nuclear experts to old hands like Gamal Halal, the State Department's top Arabic translator and former Ross associate from his days as Special Middle East envoy] has ruled out the use of intermediaries in its outreach to Iran. "There are plenty of people out there who profess to know how to get US-Iran talks going," says one well-informed diplomat. "But the US does not need a middle man to talk to Iran." A second decision, already apparent, is to encourage US diplomats to engage their Iranian counterparts at any legitimate international forum. Afghanistan related talks, now, as in the past, are considered the most appealing type of venues, given the mutual interest both countries have in preventing a resurgence of the Taliban and thesuppression of the heroin trade [A growing domestic problem inIran].
At the same time, the policy makers (who also include Acting Assistant Secretary of State Jeffrey Feltman and National Security Council Staffer Puneet Talwar] are aware they cannot afford an open-ended dialogue. "The Iranians are masters at buying time," says one well-informed source. "It has to be quickly determined if discussions with them have no other aim." At the same time the Administration is seeking to engage Iran, it will also be pursuing increased economic sanctions. They believe that especially with oil at depressed prices, the economic situation in Iran is deteriorating.
The issue of the upcoming June Presidential elections also figures in Administration decision making. The policy makers are wary of offering inducements that could be portrayed by hardliners like President Ahmadinejad as concessions. More important, the Administration's team recognizes that even if a "moderate" wins the election, it will not stop Iran's "march towards acquiring nuclear capability." However, tempering this harsh appraisal is the belief that the defeat of Ahmadinejad could well have an impact on Ayotollah Khameini. "Khameini maybe the `Supreme leader,' says one Iran expert but he also has to function as a arbiter among a number of power centers and a setback to the hard liners could well affect his calculations on how to respond to US overtures."
However, certain proposed overtures have already been rejected. Well-informed sources say the Obama Administration will not apologize for what the Iranians consider past US transgressions. "[Former Secretary of State] Madeleine Albright tried that and it was a bust," notes one veteran analyst. But in a gesture to the Iranian leadership's sensitivities, public US overtures will not be made to the general population in order to avoid the perception that the Administration is "trying to go over the heads of Iran's rulers," as one well-informed source puts it.
Perhaps the most important decision made so far is to focus on the nuclear issue and not attempt what some observers have called a "universal deal" with Iran. The thinking behind this is not only that time is running out on preventing Iran from developing a nuclear weapon, but that a so-called universal deal would be too much of a reach, given the many differences between the two countries. Moreover, some on the Ross team have argued that if the nuclear issue could be "solved" then other outstanding issues, for example, support for terrorists, could more readily addressed.
Ross and his cohorts have also made it clear that Israel's increasing alarm over the pace and direction of the Iranian nuclear program is not the sole nor even the most important reason for quick US action. They fear that if they do not make significant progress in the next six to eight months then Iran will become a "millstone around the neck" of the Administration for its entire term of office.
Because little in the way of political or economic supportis expected from either the Chinese or the Russians, it has also been decided not to return to the UN Security Council for a resolution seeking tougher sanctions against Iran. Indeed, the Administration, while seeking and likely to gain the backing of key European allies, even the previous mechanism for talks with Iran that were led by the British, French and Germans will be, by common agreement, discarded in favor of the new US-led effort.
Arab help, however, will be solicited. As both George Mitchell and Secretary Clinton have discovered on their recent trips to the region [much to the former's chagrin] Iran has emerged as the number one issue among US friends in the Arab world. Privately, Arab leaders are telling the US to "squeeze" Iran. And recently, when a key Iranian official referred to Bahrain as Iran's "Fourteenth Province", Egyptian President Mubarak flew to Bahrain the very next day, while Morocco's King Mohammed broke diplomatic relations.
Arab leaders are also trying to entice Syria back into thefold. A meeting held earlier this month in Riyadh brought together Mubarak, Saudi King Abdullah and Syria's President Assad. While the subjects that dominated the meeting were the Palestinian issue and Lebanon, it was a clear attempt to turn a page in the Egyptian and Saudi relationship with Syria which had deteriorated since the 2005 assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, a close ally of the Saudi royal family. Syrian complicity in the assassination has long been suspected by many and in 2007, it was decided to establish an International Tribunal to look into the matter [The Tribunal,which is only now getting underway, is a source of anxiety to the Syrians. According to informed sources, Assad asked King Abdullah at the recent meeting if he could "help" mitigate the potential problems coming out of the Commission's inquiries]. (Feltman!)

Reconciliation between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority is also part of the attempt to forge a common Arab position. In the aftermath of the Gaza fighting, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas finds himself in a weakened political position. Moreover, the US and Israel are still determined to prevent legitimacy from being conferred on Hamas. While publicly US officials adhere to that line, some junior State Department staffers are clamoring for a relaxation of this policy as well as a get tough with Israel attitude by Mitchell. So far, however,they have made no impact on Senior US officials.