LEBANON: Elections outlook good for "March 8" Alliance

[From Oxford Analytica]

SUBJECT: The outlook for parliamentary elections on June 7.
SIGNIFICANCE: The Western-oriented, anti-Syrian March 14 alliance currently holds a slim majority in the parliament, sensitive ministerial portfolios such as Defence, and the key office of prime minister. These repositories of institutional power, critical to Lebanon's future domestic, regional and international bearing, are up for grabs in June's contest with the March 8 minority alliance.
ANALYSIS: The race between the March 14 alliance and the March 8 alliance headed by Hizbollah and General Michel Aoun's Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) will be decided in as many as 30 battleground seats including several in the western Bekaa, Zahle and even in the Shia-dominated South -- surpassing the historic focus on a few Christian battlegrounds in Mount Lebanon. Peaceful outlook. The close nature of the contest augurs well for stability and calm before the polls. At a popular level both sides:

* believe they hold a slight advantage; and

* are invested in the electoral process, which is seen as legitimate at home and abroad.

Central figures in the majority and the opposition alliances appear to have come to terms with a minimally acceptable scenario should the other side win, further mitigating the prospects for violence:

* For March 8, this would likely mean the continuation of the post-Doha period of power-sharing realities.

* For March 14, a loss would likely entail a strategic withdrawal from any new national unity government -- leaving March 8 in the difficult and unfamiliar position of having to govern, conduct international relations, and hold together its own potentially unstable alliances.

Minority edge? However, there are signs that the March 14 alliance may be facing electoral difficulties:

*The clearest indicator is the alliance's subtle encouragement of "neutral" or "independent" candidates.

* Given the FPM's continued strength amongst Christians, March 14 leaders appear to believe that the best chance of winning battleground seats in Metn, Kesrouan, Jbeil, Baabda and Aley is to tap into the popularity of Maronite President Michel Suleiman rather than rely on the March 14 brand.

The "neutrals" strategy is vulnerable on at least two counts:
1. Suleiman reluctance. Suleiman has made it clear that he does not want to engage in electioneering on behalf of neutral candidates. Without the president's political capital, it remains doubtful whether any such candidates could beat the FPM list or stymie efforts already underway to paint such figures as a kind of 'March 14 lite'. Given Suleiman's longstanding avoidance (?) of politicking, as well as his evident belief in the need for a president who can credibly mediate between the majority and minority, his active involvement on behalf of a neutral list appears unlikely ahead of the June contest.

2. Dividing forces. Although March 14 -- like the minority alliance -- is still engaged in the process of assembling its list and ironing out internal conflicts over seats, it may prove difficult to avoid three-way races where March 14 and neutral candidates compete for votes to the benefit of the FPM. Deeper troubles. Even if the strategy of relying on neutrals progresses under ideal circumstances, March 14 faces more serious problems:
a. Organisation. The August 2007 by-election in the Christian battleground of Metn, in which a relatively unknown FPM candidate defeated leading March 14 figure and former President Amin Gemayel, provided compelling evidence that the decades-old machinery of voter mobilisation employed by key March 14 parties was woefully inadequate against the modern campaign methods of the FPM and some of its allies:

* Unlike past elections, the contest this June will be held on only one day, with agility, communication and voter enthusiasm more critical than ever.

*The Sunni Future Movement led by Saad al-Hariri is intent on increasing dismal turnout among its potential supporters in some battleground areas, reportedly offering free travel to Lebanon, among other incentives, in the hope of overcoming daunting statistical prospects.

*In the crucial district of Baabda, voter turnout among the approximately 8,000 registered Sunni voters was only 25% in 2005; Hariri and March 14 more generally hope to increase this number markedly but will be facing long odds given that Hizbollah and Amal are also trying to boost their own turnout; 45% of the 32,000 registered Shia voted in Baabda in 2005.

b. Ideas. Adding to March 14's troubles, the alliance's ideological approach -- with its emphasis on condemning Hizbollah's arms and demonising Syria -- appears increasingly anachronistic:

*The raft of cordial and arguably productive visits to Damascus by key Lebanese figures, including the president, the heads of the army and the interior ministry, and more recently March 14's own defence minister, Elias Murr, has diminished the appeal of anti-Syrian rhetoric.

*The international trend towards direct engagement and even rapprochement with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad has diminished the geopolitical viability of a straightforwardly anti-Syrian stand

* The March 8 alliance is advantageously positioned to take advantage of the engagement trend, implying that it is at the vanguard of European and US thinking on how to approach Damascus.

* The March 8 alliance is also well positioned to take advantage of concerns about war; after Gaza, the Israeli leadership appears more dangerous and unpredictable than ever to most Lebanese, making the case for resistance capabilities clear, while March 14's dogged emphasis on UN Security Council resolutions rings hollow.

*Aoun can now tout Hizbollah's lack of military intervention in the Gaza crisis as a vindication of his alliance with the party; the alliance could shatter, however, should Hizbollah drag Lebanon into another devastating conflict with Israel.

Outlook. Although electioneering has only begun recently with the announcement of several small party alignments, the minority coalition presently appears well positioned to gain a slim majority in the next four-year parliament. Key to the minority's early advantage in all of these areas is its greater coherence, its superior ability to mobilise constituencies, and its better ideological positioning in the context of regional developments. However, these regional dynamics -- particularly regarding war risks with Israel and prospective moves by the Obama administration on the Syrian, Palestinian and Iranian tracks -- could yet again shift the electoral battlefield.
CONCLUSION: Organisational advantages, tighter alliances and, most importantly, present regional political trends all favour the March 8 alliance. There is a strong chance that the next Lebanese government will be formed by a coalition underpinned by Hizbollah -- raising difficult questions for the United States in its policy of isolating and undermining the party.