Lebanese Armed Forces: Challenges & Opportunities in post-Syria Lebanon

More complicated than whatever recommendation CSIS is coming up with. But to simplify things, trust the Israelis to try to lean on Washington to snuff such attempts. Trust the Israelis to remain an aggressive amalgam of people, and trust the cumulative effect of their "defeats" (06 and 09') to throw the debate in the air ... CSIS, here (full report)

"....The LAF has shown that it is one of the few Lebanese institutions in the post-Syria era trusted by a substantial cross-section of Lebanese society. However, its force development over the 2005-2008 period does not reflect its increasingly important institutional role in Lebanese and regional security. ...

Any attempt to strengthen the LAF so that it can fight Hizbullah will fail. Close to 30 percent of the officers corps is Shi‘a and given that the LAF is a reflection of Lebanese society, it cannot be ordered to act militarily against one or another community. The U.S. needs to recognize that building up the LAF as a deterrent against Lebanon’s neighbors undermines Hizbullah’s logic regarding its weapons arsenal. Accordingly, the U.S. should focus on helping the LAF to lay the foundation for Hizbullah disarmament in the mid-to-long term rather than all-out confrontation in the short term.
(therefore, and in the meantime)... U.S. policy towards the LAF is unclear and hurts U.S. efforts to bolster the LAF as a positive force in Lebanon and the region. These policy ambiguities should be revised and the U.S. must articulate clearly whether or not it will provide the LAF with the heavy combat systems it needs for force development. ...."