"Assad's recent experiences taught him that, his stubborn adherence to his positions extricated him from isolation & consolidated his power"

[Oxford Analytica]

EVENT: Lebanese Christian leader Michel Aoun today travelled to Syria, meeting Syrian President Bashar al-Assad -- the first time since fighting a bitter 'war of liberation' against Syria in 1989-90.

SIGNIFICANCE: Upon Aoun's return from exile after the 2005 assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri and subsequent Syrian withdrawal, he sided with Syrian allies against the Western-backed government. Today's visit to Damascus highlights Syria's success in retaining strategic influence in Lebanon, despite its bloody past involvement and ignominious departure.

ANALYSIS: In recent years Syria found itself almost completely isolated, with the stability, and perhaps even the very existence, of the regime becoming increasingly endangered. In addition to constant worries over Israel's intentions, the Syrians were concerned about the intentions of the Bush administration, which did not hide the fact that regime change was, if not a central objective, at least on its 'wish list'.

Defiance. However, neither isolation nor perceptions of danger brought policy change. On the contrary, Syria continued playing for high stakes in Lebanon, persisted in its recalcitrance on Iraq, and tightened ties with Iran and Hizbollah. This apparent stubbornness was driven by a number of considerations:
*The regime deeply distrusted the Bush administration, suspecting that it desired regime change; it did not believe that the US administration was prepared to pressure Israel or otherwise satisfy Syrian aims.
*It calculated that any concessions would be met by increased demands that Syria would ultimately be unable to meet, similar to the case of Saddam Hussein's Iraq; the regime resolved not to show any sign of weakness.
*It benefited from being seen publicly to oppose the Bush administration, wildly unpopular in Syria and the region; the shaky legitimacy of President Bashar al-Assad was consolidated by his opposition to US and Israeli projects.

Relations with the Bush administration reached a low point on October 26, 2008, when US helicopter-borne commandos attacked a farm near the Syrian village of al-Sukkariyya in the Abu Kamal area, not far from the border with Iraq. US sources claimed that an Iraqi al-Qaida activist named Abu Ghadiyya was killed in the attack.

Rapprochement. However, just a week after the US attack, Barack Obama was elected president of the United States. Damascus welcomed Obama's election and expressed the hope that the US elections would mark the beginning of a new era in relations between the two countries. Such hope was founded on a number of preceding developments:

1.Lebanon. The events of May 2008 in Lebanon, which witnessed a demonstration of force by Syria's allies, highlighted Syria's dominant role; this was reinforced by the Syrian diplomatic contribution to negotiations in Doha that led to a relaxation of tensions in Lebanon

2.Israel. Nearly simultaneously with the Doha Agreement, it was announced that Israel and Syria had been pursuing indirect peace talks with Turkish mediation. Although the announcement was received frostily by the Bush administration, Israeli strategic thinkers appeared to have concluded -- particularly in the wake of the disastrous 2006 conflict with Hizbollah -- that weakening the perceived 'Iranian axis' required transforming Syria's foreign policy orientation.

3.Europe. The developments in Lebanon and Israel encouraged European players to re-engage. French President Nicolas Sarkozy took the lead, inviting Assad to Paris in July and then convening a summit with Assad in Damascus together with the emir of Qatar and the Turkish prime minister. Since then, a regular procession of European foreign ministers have passed through Damascus, with Syrian Foreign Minister Walid al-Mouallem once again welcome in most European capitals. Syria's long-frozen EU partnership agreement is to be signed soon; human rights objections are long forgotten.

4.Back-channel discussions. Despite mutual recriminations, the leadership kept its channels to the United States open, and succeeded in encouraging a number of key Democrats to re-evaluate US Syria policy. Zbignew Brzezinski, Nancy Pelosi and John Kerry all visited Damascus and met Assad; they appear to have been encouraged by the prospects for rapprochement.

Objectives: The new situation presents Syria with a golden opportunity to advance its interests. Key objectives are to:
*ensure the stability of the regime and remove any possible US threat to its existence;
*get back the Golan Heights;
*restore and legitimise Syrian influence in Lebanon;
*see an end to the US presence in Iraq and prevent the emergence of an Iraqi entity hostile to Syria;

*and obtain economic and political advantages from an improvement of relations with Europe and the United States.

Prospects for achieving these goals look good on the surface:
*The most grandiose ambitions of the Bush administration with regard to regime change are dead, and the prospects for a rapprochement under the Obama administration appear promising.
*The United States is closer than ever to leaving Iraq.

*Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert is amenable to a peace agreement in which Israel would return the Golan Heights.
*In Lebanon, the assumption that Syria could be removed completely from the scene has been shown to be groundless.

However, although further diplomatic and economic successes are likely, there is a significant likelihood that the full potential of the situation will not be grasped:
*Syria's foreign policy has long been characterised by caution, indecisiveness and passivity; bold gestures such as Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in 1977 are unknown.
*Negotiations have long been characterised by a hard-line, unwavering, all-or-nothing approach.
*Unlike Sadat's Egypt, which abandoned the Soviet Union for US sponsorship, Syria is not interested in a wholesale strategic shift; the main concern is to guarantee the status quo, with a minimum of concessions on domestic matters or relations with Iran, which Syria sees as counterbalancing the West and thus creating space for independence in decision-making.
*The return of the Golan Heights, which is the one prize that could tempt Syria thoroughly to reorient its foreign policy, depends on an Israeli domestic political situation that seems increasingly inclined to the Right.

Outlook. Syria has returned to the limelight and will be the focus of intensive diplomatic activity for the foreseeable future. Syria's importance will also grow in light of parliamentary elections in Lebanon scheduled for May or June, which could further increase the power of Syria's allies. At the same time, it is doubtful that Syria's dialogues with the West will augur a dramatic change in policies. After all, the experience of recent years has taught Assad that it was precisely his stubborn adherence to his positions that extricated him from isolation and consolidated his power.
Therefore, there is no reason for him to alter or abandon the stances he has taken, especially now that there are no obvious threats or constraints on Syria compelling him to do so.

CONCLUSION: Syria's foreign policy achievements in 2008 are considerable, and look set to continue into 2009. However, while the regional and international situation is becoming more favourable, the leadership may well not take full advantage of the opportunity for transformation, preferring the safety of the status quo.