| "...Genuine reconciliation between Sunnis and Shiites remains elusive. The “Sunni Awakening”—the Sunnis’ decision to cooperate with U.S. forces against AQI—ranks among the biggest reasons for the decline in violence in Iraq. But don’t be fooled: The awakening represents an accommodation with the United States, not the Shiites who dominate Iraq’s government. These security gains could dissolve if the Sunni “Sons of Iraq”—many of them former insurgents—are not integrated into official forces or gainfully employed, and if emerging tribal leaders don’t get an opportunity to share power at the local and national levels through elections......Iraq could easily backslide into mass violence. The surge was supposed to be about buying time to build Iraqi capacity and create breathing space for political accommodation. Yet, as Iraqi capacity and confidence have increased, Maliki and his allies seem less inclined to reach out to their adversaries. By emphasizing capacity over political will, the Bush administration has failed to force Iraqi leaders to make tough compromises. Instead, it too often conveys messages of unconditional support to the Iraqi government that undermine the behind-the-scenes cajoling of U.S. commanders and diplomats..."
"...But Iraq's government is suspicious of such groups, fearing their decision to break with the insurgency was a short-term tactic to gain U.S. money and support. The government fears they will eventually turn their guns against Iraq's majority Shiites Since the rise of the allied Sunni movement, America has spent some $200 million on salaries, equipment and training for the fighters, which now number nearly 100,000. The U.S. goal is for many of them to be integrated into the Iraqi army or police, providing the fighters with long-term incomes...."
"....What is the principal strategic outcome from the war in Iraq? According to the index’s experts, it’s not the end of Saddam’s dictatorship, a rise in militant Islam, or even a war-torn Iraq. Rather, almost half of the experts say that the most important outcome is the emergence of Iran as the most powerful country in the Middle East. Worse, three quarters of the experts believe that the threat posed by Iran’s nuclear ambitions is rising. The U.S.-led war has not only benefited the United States’ chief regional nemesis, but the experts are no longer optimistic that Washington knows what to do about it. Their confidence that U.S. policies can adequately address the Iranian threat has never been lower. The experts give U.S. policy toward Tehran an average grade of just 2.8 on a 10-point scale, where 10 means the United States is doing the best possible job. More than 80 percent of the experts, including 69 percent of conservatives, believe that U.S. policy toward Iran is negatively affecting America’s national security goals. This appraisal represents the most critical view of U.S. policy toward Iran since the index began two years ago...." 
أدلى رئيس "اللقاء الديموقراطي" النائب وليد جنبلاط بموقفه الاسبوعي لجريدة "الانباء" الصادرة عن الحزب التقدمي الاشتراكي ومما جاء فيه: "نتطلع لأن تترجم النتائج التي توصلت إليها القمة اللبنانية - السورية من خلال إجراءات فعلية لا سيما على مستوى التبادل الديبلوماسي الذي جاء لينهي سنوات طويلة من الجدل، خصوصا أن في التاريخ الحديث المشترك بين البلدين، كان هناك عقدة من بعض كبار الاستقلاليين السوريين تجاه لبنان. لذلك، نأمل أن نكون قد طوينا هذا الملف نحو مرحلة جديدة مرتكزاتها الاساسية الاعتراف بإستقلال لبنان نهائيا وربط هذا الاعتراف بسلوك سوري جديد مغاير لما شهدته العقود الماضية من تدخل مستمر في الشؤون الداخلية وتابع :"في ما يتعلق بملف المفقودين، لا بد من التذكير أن المخابرات السورية كانت موجودة في لبنان وليس المخابرات اللبنانية كانت موجودة في سوريا. فإذا كان الجانب السوري يطالب بمفقودين من تنظيمات مسلحة أو جنود أو مدنيين، فهذا يمكن طرحه في إطار لجنة مشتركة فاعلة تضع جدولا بالأسماء وتعطى صلاحية زيارة السجون في البلدين بهدف جلاء ملابسات هذه القضية الانسانية بالدرجة الأولى واردف:" أما بالنسبة للمجلس الاعلى اللبناني - السوري، فإذا أردنا السير بمنطق تنقية العلاقات وفتح صفحة جديدة بين البلدين، فمن الافضل الاكتفاء بالعلاقات الديبلوماسية المنتظرة والتي تؤسس لمرحلة جديدة عوض الاستمرار وفق الاطر السابقة التي كانت تشوبها الكثير من العثرات. وغني عن القول أن ما جاء في إتفاق الطائف يفترض أن يسري على هذه العلاقات وقد جاء فيه ما حرفيته: "إن لبنان لا يسمح بأن يكون ممرا أو مستقرا لأي قوة أو دولة أو تنظيم يستهدف المساس بأمنه أو أمن سوريا، وإن سوريا الحريصة على أمن لبنان وإستقلاله ووحدته ووفاق أبنائه لا تسمح بأي عمل يهدد أمنه وإستقلاله وسيادته."".".
Within the Bush administration, “the fight between the hawks and the doves” erupted anew, said one administration official. In this case, the people he called the “hawks” —Mr. Cheney and the assistant secretary of state for Europe, Daniel Fried — argued for more American military aid for Georgia; the “doves” — Ms. Rice, Mr. Hadley, Mr. Burns — urged restraint.. ....Ms. Rice traveled to Tbilisi, Georgia, in July, where, aides said, she privately told Mr. Saakashvili not to let Russia provoke him into a fight he could not win. But her public comments, delivered while standing next to Mr. Saakashvili during a news conference, were far stronger and more supportive. And when she brought up NATO membership, mentioning that the Bush administration had pushed for it in Bucharest, Mr. Saakashvili jumped on the opportunity to get a public commitment that the administration would bring the matter up again with NATO before leaving office. “So are you going — I understood you are going to give a tough fight for us in December,” he said. Ms. Rice: “Always, Mr. President. We always fight for our friends.”
“I came here eight years ago with my husband and children, we were in the SLA, we had true peace with Israel. After the IDF pullout from Lebanon we didn’t know what to do, they neglected us. “We came to this country and we know that people receive all their rights here. For eight years they didn’t know how to absorb us like they should have; they divided us,” she said in sorrow. ..."
In Al Hayat, here".....This visit follows on that of King Abdullah II of Jordan, which involved a similar request. The rise in oil prices (which are still high compared to only a couple of years ago) has given Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki sudden clout in the region. It is clear what Jordan and Lebanon want from him. The question is, what does he want from them? So far the quid pro quos are not being reported, unless it is just greater recognition and re-integration into the Arab political system. For instance, Saudi Arabia still declines to let al-Maliki visit Riyadh, apparently because of his enmity toward the Sunni Arab Awakening Councils, which are in part a Saudi project. Seniora and his backer Saad Hariri are close to Saudi Arabia and presumably will be intermediaries for al-Maliki in back channel communications to the Kingdom." (Cole) (Siniora 'chatting' with Chief of Egyptian Intelligence, O Sleiman) Professor Cole forgot to mention that Hariri's last visit did not go well: He visited Sistani on the heels of the collapse of the praetorian branch (lol) of his Future Movement, and told Sistani that the seat of Shia'a leadership was in Najaf and not Qom ... I don't know who advises the prodigy, but they totally forgot to mention that Sistani is a HUGE FAN of Iran. The meeting was promptly dismissed! 
Special INEGMA Report on Russia-Georgia Conflict Impact on ME Region.
THE RUSSO-GEORGIAN WAR AND GEOPOLITICAL IMPLICATIONS FOR THE GULF LITTORAL
Dr. Theodore Karasik
Director of Research and Development
INEGMA - Institute for Near East and Gulf Military Analysis
The August 2008 Russo-Georgian war is much more than about Moscow's claims to South Ossetia or Abkhazia. There are broad regional implications that affect the Middle East and the Gulf littoral in particular.
Background & Developments
South Ossetian separatists, supported by Moscow, escalated their machine gun and mortar fire attacks against neighboring Georgian villages last week. In response, Georgia attacked the separatist capital South Ossetian Tskhinvali with artillery to suppress fire. Tskhinvali suffered severe damage, thus providing the pretext for Moscow's invasion of Georgia. Russians in Abkhazia are also fighting the Georgians.
As Russia responded with overwhelming force, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin flew from the Beijing Olympics to Vladikavkaz, taking control of the military operations. Putin sidelined his successor, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, thereby leaving no doubt as to who is in charge. Medvedev's role is to handle the international diplomatic front which seems to be not on the table. Under Putin's orders, the 58th Russian Army of the North Caucasus Military District rolled into South Ossetia, reinforced by the 76th Airborne "Pskov" Division. Cossacks from the neighboring Russian territories moved in to combat the Georgians as well.
The Black Sea Fleet is blockading Georgia from the sea, while Russian ballistic missiles and its air force are attacking Georgian military bases and cities including Tbilisi International Airport .What Russia is trying to do-and looking like she may succeed- is to establish a pro-Russian regime in Georgia that will also bring the strategic Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and the Baku-Erzurum (Turkey) gas pipeline under Moscow's control.
Impact on Israel
More importantly and with immense strategic implications, Russia is also trying to send Israel a clear message that Tel Aviv's military support for Tbilisi in organizing, training and equipping Georgia's army will no longer be tolerated. Private Israeli security firms and retired military officials are actively involved in Georgian security. In addition, Israel's interest in Caspian oil and gas pipelines is growing and Moscow seeks to stop this activity at this time. Intense negotiations about current and future pipelines between Israel, Turkey, Georgia, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan are tied to receiving oil at the terminal at Ashkelon and on to the Red Sea port of Eilat. Finally, Russia is sending a clear message that Moscow will not tolerate American influence in Georgia nor Tbilisi's interests –supported by the pro-U.S. Georgian President Mikhal Saakashvili--in joining NATO. Overall, the military crisis will push Moscow to punish Israel for its assistance to Georgia, and challenge the U.S. to do more than voice rhetoric.  Impact on Arab Gulf States, Iran
In the Gulf, there are several broad implications. First is the impact of the war on Gulf investment in the Caucasus and in Russia. The Russian damage to Ras al Khaimah's investment plan in Georgia is troublesome. The Ras Al Khaimah Government has recently invested in the Georgian port of Poti where its real estate development arm Rakeen is developing a free zone. Rakeen is also developing some mixed-use projects near capital Tbilisi. The company has three projects in Georgia - Tiblisi Heights and Uptown Tiblisi - with a total value of Dh7.3 billion, while a third is being planned. However, Ras Al Khaimah's other major investment did not remain unhurt. The Georgian harbor Poti, which is majority owned by the Ras Al Khaimah Investment Authority (Rakia), was badly damaged in Russian air raids. In April 2008, Georgia sold a 51 per cent stake in the Poti port area to Rakia to develop a free economic zone (FEZ) in a 49-year management concession, and to manage a new port terminal. The creation of FEZ, to be developed by Rakeen, was officially inaugurated by Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili April 15 2008. Previously the trend in Russo-GCC relations focused on strengthening the "north-south" economic corridor between the two regions; this linkage may now be in jeopardy if more Gulf investment goes up in smoke. The second implication is the growing military presence in both Gulf waters and the Mediterranean Sea by the West and Russia that cannot be separated from the Russo-Georgian conflict. There is an unprecedented build-up of American, French, British and Canadian naval and air assets-the most since the 2003 invasion of Iraq-that are to be in place shortly for a partial naval blockade of Iran. Three U.S. strike forces are en route to the Gulf namely the USS Theodore Roosevelt, the USS Ronald Reagan and the USS Iwo Jima. Already in place are the USS Abraham Lincoln in the Arabian Sea opposite Iranian shores and the USS Peleliu which is cruising in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. There is also a growing Russian navy deployment begun earlier this year to the eastern Mediterranean comprising the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov with approximately 50 Su-33 warplanes that have the capacity for mid-air refueling along with the guided missile heavy cruiser Moskva. This means the Russian warplanes could reach the Gulf from the Mediterranean, a distance of some 850 miles and would be forced to fly over Syria but Iraq as well, where the skies are controlled by the U.S. military. The Russian task force is believed to be composed of a dozen warships as well as several submarines. While the West is seeking to defend Gulf oil sources destined to the West and the Far East, Russia is increasing its desire to control Caspian oil resources and setting herself in a strategic position near the Levant. A final implication is what may be a complete collapse of any back channel communications via Russia to Iran regarding Tehran's preparation for confrontation with the West and slowing down Iran's pursuit of a nuclear weapon. In the past year, Russia acted as an intermediary between the U.S., Israel, the GCC-specifically Saudi Arabia-and Tehran. With the Russian-Georgian war, the door may now slam shut between these players. Saudi Arabia, for instance, is attempting to halt the Russian sale of the S-300 anti-air defense system to Tehran and also is seeking to purchase large amounts of Russian weapons in order to "buy-off" Moscow's pursuit of selling conventional weapons to Iran. As a consequence of the Russo-Georgian war, Russia may start to play hardball with going through with arms sales to Iran and dropping support for sanctions against Iran that may invite a unilateral Israeli strike on Iran.
As further evidence of the heightening of tensions, Kuwait is activating its "Emergency War Plan" as the massive U.S. and European flotilla is heading for the region. Part of Kuwait's plan is to put strategic petroleum assets in reserve in the Far East and outside the forthcoming battle space. And Israel is building up its strike capabilities for an attack on Iran, purchasing 90 F-16I planes that can carry enough fuel to reach Iran. Israel has also bought two new Dolphin submarines from Germany capable of firing nuclear-armed warheads, in addition to the three already in service with its navy. Many strategic and tactical pieces for a confrontation are falling into place. Overall, analysts have argued in the past few years that there might be a series of triggers that could force a confrontation between the West and Iran. Some maintained that this trigger may occur in the Gulf itself or in the Levant-whether accidental or on purpose. There were potential triggers before-the April 2007 seizure of British sailors in the Gulf, the September 2007 Israeli attack on a suspected Syrian nuclear facility, and Hezbollah's seizure of Western Beirut in May 2008. Now it appears that a more serious trigger may be the Russo-Georgian war –despite geographical distance-- that may carry dire consequences for all-especially in the Gulf littoral. "......What will be the impact of these trends on the Middle East? Ideally, it would be wise to wait with any major action in the area until Russian domination in its closer neighborhood is established. But if opportunities for a Russian return to the Middle East arise, they should be used. There are no illusions about finding allies in the region. As one of the last Tsars (Alexander III) said (and as Putin repeated after him), Russia has only two reliable allies: its army and artillery. Among the police and army ideologues there has been of late the idea to give up Panslav dreams, since the Slav brothers can be trusted even less than the rest, and to consider instead a strategic alliance with Turkic peoples. But these are largely fantasies. The main aim will be to weaken America’s position in the Middle East. In this respect, there are differences of opinion in the Kremlin. Some ex-generals have come on record to the effect that a war with America is inevitable in a perspective of 10-15 years. The influence of these radical military men should not be overrated. But it is certainly true that the belief that America is Russia’s worst and most dangerous enemy is quite common (see for instance the recent Russkaia Doktrina). The downfall of the Soviet empire is thought to be mainly if not entirely America’s fault; Washington, it is believed, is trying to hurt Russia all the time in every possible way. This paranoiac attitude is deeply rooted (in contrast to China) and it will be an uphill struggle in the years to come to persuade the Russian leadership that this is not the case. Moscow has threatened to supply greater help to Iran and Syria, which would certainly annoy America and perhaps hurt it. But Russia does not want to do this at the price of creating political and military problems for itself in the years to come. Russian distrust does not stop at its southern borders. The attack on South Ossetia provided Russia with an unique opportunity; it was motivated by a militant Georgian nationalism which failed to understand that small and weak countries, unlike big and powerful ones, are not in a position to keep separatist regions indefinitely under their control. Such opportunities will not frequently return, and other opportunities will have to be created by the Kremlin—probably by exploiting existing conflicts such as those in the Middle East. This could open the door to serious miscalculations."
In WashingtonWhispers, here"...Bush then took a seat at a table with two dozen junior employees. They included analysts, clandestine operatives, scientists and engineers, and support personnel. In between bites, he asked them about their jobs and where they have served overseas. One analyst, who played a key role for the CIA in identifying the nuclear reactor that was being built in Syria with North Korean assistance, gave the president a bronze commemorative coin that Hayden had presented to each agency employee who was directly involved in that intelligence effort. The 3-inch diameter coin was inscribed with, "Syria-North Korea Project" and the words, "No Core, No War."
"When I arrived in the operations room I saw a book of IDF safety instructions that shouldn't have been there," he said. "There were IDF CDs that explicitly said, 'Confidential' documenting army activities, charts from special units' operations, and officers' names." He added that the room was not guarded, making this information easily obtainable to everyone. Tomer said the main reason for the infidelity was mercenary. "The training companies wanted to finish the projects as quickly as possible in order to create more projects and make more money," he said. "We knew the training had to be completed quickly because the soldiers would soon have to get into real military activity."
You see a remarkable amount of credulity about the need to back “pro-American” leaders from Ahmed Chalabi to Mikheil Saakashvili to Pervez Musharraf and whomever else when in fact none of these people (as Chalabi and Musharraf have managed to make crystal clear over the years with certain betrayals) are, in fact, monomaniacally focused on advancing American interests. (Matt: You need to check out Siniora and more recently Chattah ... but heck, Lebanon is peanuts compared to Iraq, Pakistan ...etc.)
"...Graziano made his comments at a press conference at UN headquarters in New York. He said that continued Israel Air Force flights in Lebanese airspace and Israel's refusal to submit maps of areas on which it dropped cluster bombs during the war constituted a "permanent violation of 1701." Graziano also referred to the village of Ghajar, which sits on the Israel-Lebanon border, as "a permanent area under occupation."
The Italian general, meanwhile, said that Hezbollah recognizes Resolution 1701, and that the militant Lebanese group and UNIFIL forces enjoy excellent cooperation with one another. He added that apart from UN and Lebanese soldiers and local hunters, no one is armed south of the Litani River...."
"...From afar, one sensed that Ledeen may be too controversial for AEI's other scholars to want him to be the public face of the think tank on Iran issues, an observation the associate described as reasonable. Ledeen is not alone in being scarcer at the influential think tank of late. Former Reagan administration Pentagon official Richard Perle is often in France and rarely makes public appearances at AEI any more; but there's no talk of Perle leaving AEI, although his role there is largely "emeritus" the associate described...."
"...The officer on Wednesday provided Iraq's national security adviser with several lists of the assassination teams' expected targets. He said the targets include many judges but would not otherwise identify them ...(Samir Geagea' did that in Lebanon...). Iraq's intelligence service is preparing operations to determine where and when the special group fighters will enter the country and is to provide an assessment to Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki...."
(Paranoia?) MELIK KAYLAN opinion in the WSJ, here"...Between Russia and Iran, in the lower Caucasus, sits a small wedge of independent soil -- namely, the soil of Azerbaijan and Georgia combined. Through those two countries runs the immensely important Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, which delivers precious oil circuitously from Azerbaijan to Turkey and out to the world. This is important not just because of the actual oil being delivered free of interference from Russia and Iran and the Middle East, but also for symbolic reasons. It says to the world that if any former Moscow colonies wish to sell their wares to the West directly, they have a right to do so, and the West will support that right. According to Georgian authorities, Russian warplanes have tried to demolish the Georgian leg of that pipeline several times in the last days. Their message cannot be clearer...."
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![Dmitry Medvedev [right] speaks with Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad during their bilateral meeting in Dushanbe on August 28, 2008](http://www.telegraph.co.uk/telegraph/multimedia/archive/00798/iran-Medvedev-460_798407c.jpg)
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