LEBANON: Sunni Islamism growth spurs radicalisation

OXFORD ANALYTICA: Wednesday, April 30 2008

EVENT: Saad al-Hariri, leader of the Future Movement and of the ruling March 14 coalition, is holding talks with opposition leaders before the next scheduled parliamentary session on May 13.
SIGNIFICANCE: Hariri's Future Movement has become the umbrella for all anti-Syrian secular Sunnis and is now the only Sunni secular movement of any significance amid a recent rise in Sunni Islamism in Lebanon. Since last year's battle with Fatah al-Islam, the traditional Sunni leadership is making a more concerted effort to manage Lebanon's various Sunni fundamentalist groups, some of which may have links to al-Qaida.
ANALYSIS: Sunnis today are estimated to form 32% of the Lebanese population. They live mostly in the coastal cities of Sidon, Tripoli and Beirut, in addition to settlements in Akkar and the Bekaa Valley. The Salafist groups mainly cluster around Tripoli and Akkar district in the north, whereas Sidon and Beirut are Hariri strongholds. The traditional Sunni political families - Salam, Karami and others -- have mostly been unconnected to actual political movements. Some were part of various Nasserist movements in the past, but those do not have much currency any more.

Islamist upsurge. Since the death of former Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri in 2005, various Sunni Islamist groups have emerged as political forces in Lebanon. Previously marginalised, they now benefit from Saad al-Hariri's attempt to create a united Sunni front in the political stand-off with the Shia opposition led by Hizbollah (see LEBANON: Army being dragged into political crisis - February 15, 2008). These groups represent various strains:

• Mainstream political movements such as Al-Jama'a al-Islamiya, Al-Ahbash, the Islamic Action Front and Hizb al-Tahrir participate in party politics and have relatively large constituencies in and around Tripoli, Beirut and Sidon (see INTERNATIONAL: Hizb ut-Tahrir channels disaffection - January 8, 2008). Jama'a, split into pro-and anti-Syrian branches, is the largest religious political group, but has lost many supporters to (the formally non-political) Salafist movements since 2005. Ahbash supports Syria staunchly.
• Salafist organisations focus on the promotion of strict Sunni Islam through social, educational and charity work. Their leaders are influential local preachers, most of whom stay clear of politics, although some tacitly endorse the formation of underground Sunni militias.
• A small number of militant Salafist-jihadist groups are inspired by al-Qaida, including Fatah al-Islam, Jund al-Sham, and Usbat al-Ansar. The militant strain has been strengthened by a considerable number of Lebanese Sunnis returning from the insurgency in Iraq since 2003 (see LEBANON: Palestinian Islamism adds to insecurity - June 5, 2007).

While very different, these groups all promote Sunni Islam as the only framework for social and political change and hence represent a growing political force in Lebanon. As a result of the Syrian departure in 2005, they now participate much more freely in public life.
Sectarian solidarity. Hariri's death deepened a sense of sectarian solidarity among Lebanon's Sunni community. In a break with their history, they started to act more like a minority sect whose existence was threatened. The new Sunni sectarianism strengthened political groups that mobilise along religious lines, forcing the Sunni traditional leaderships of influential families and mainstream religious scholars to seek support from Islamists and even Salafist groups in order to retain control of their constituencies.
Leaving aside the relatively weak Sunni-controlled Murabitun militia in the Lebanese civil war, the Sunnis have always been a rarity in the country: a sect without a militia. Rafik al-Hariri cultivated this image, and distanced his secular and business-oriented Future Movement from Islamist groups such as Jama'a, and particularly from radical groups.
This approach suited the Syrian regime, which feared cooperation between Lebanese groups and Syria's illicit Islamist opposition. At the same time, the Syrians promoted some mainstream groups such as Ahbash which they felt they could control, and allowed radical groups to operate in contained 'security islands' such as the Ain al-Hilweh Palestinian camp. However, any challenge to the Lebanese state was met with force.
Co-opting Sunni extremists. The departure of Syrian troops in April 2005 gave Islamists freedom to participate in politics for the first time in decades and to renegotiate their relationship with the traditional Sunni elite. As a result, Saad al-Hariri from the beginning of his tenure as leader of the Sunni community had difficulty continuing his father's line. In the 2005 parliamentary elections, Hariri spent heavily to shore up Sunni support in the contested north Lebanon district. As Jama'a boycotted the elections, some of that money ended up with Salafist preachers.
Hariri's effective funding of Salafist networks was enhanced following the 2006 Hizbollah-Israel war, when a strain of Jama'a changed allegiance to the Hizbollah-led opposition, forcing Hariri to rely even more on Salafists. Since 2005, Hariri's policies have benefited Sunni extremists in several ways:

• In July 2005, various Sunni militants were pardoned and released. They probably drifted back into militant networks.
• In 2006, the extremist group Jund al-Sham was reported to have been paid thousands of dollars to leave Sidon. Several of these militants joined Fatah al-Islam.
• More generally, Hariri and Prime Minister Fouad Siniora allowed militant Salafists to organise as long as they did not carry out attacks in Lebanon. This continuation of the Syrian policy saves the army the effort of confronting armed groups.

This is augmented by a lack of clear ideological direction in the Future Movement's leadership, which often forces it to resort to sectarian rhetoric in order to mobilise its social base. To this end, Islamist groups with broad popular appeal can be useful tools in shoring up street-level support, inadvertently strengthening the Salafist trend in the population.
Nahr al-Bared fall-out. Last year's protracted battle between the Lebanese army and the al-Qaida-inspired Sunni group Fatah al-Islam brought Hariri's dealings with hard-line Sunni groups to greater Lebanese and international attention, highlighting key concerns:

• Hariri, the Future Movement and its associated media had been using sectarian language to mobilise their supporters, fuelling the radicalisation of the Sunni 'street'.
• Unlike most Arab countries, Lebanon had not imposed special procedures for the transfer of funds, transforming it into a hub for terrorist funding and coordination.

Nahr al-Bared was a wake-up call to the Lebanese government and the March 14 coalition, whose Christian elements have been alarmed by occasional anti-Christian rhetoric from Salafist groups. This year, buoyed by the army's victory over Fatah al-Islam, state officials and security services have become increasingly involved in de-radicalisation efforts, as have the mainstream Sunni institutions in Lebanon:

• Dar al-Ifta, the Sunni religious establishment in Lebanon, is planning to create a Directorate for Religious Education, tasked with supervising Islamic schools and colleges, and an advisory board consisting of all Islamic parties and groups in the north, designed to help monitor Islamic groups in the north and prevent further radicalisation.
• In recent months, representatives of the Lebanese internal security forces have met a delegation of Sunni preachers and religious scholars from Salafist organisations and institutes in the north in order to curb both radicalisation and moral and financial support for militant groups.

CONCLUSION: The current campaign to stem Sunni radicalisation may be too little too late. Lebanon is paying the price for years of Syrian policies of divide and rule, which allowed radical networks to organise, while repressing more mainstream organisations. The chaotic period after Syria's departure, along with Hariri's desperate need for Sunni support, has given radical groups scope to exploit the growing popular appeal of fundamentalist Sunni Islam in the region, which in Lebanon is exacerbated by Sunni-Shia tensions surrounding the political deadlock.