(Excerpts)
"... Others see a more sinister motive behind the NIE's highlighting this one aspect of Iran's nuclear program. "If I had to put it on a bumper sticker," says one State Department official, "It would say `Bush Got It Wrong Again.'" This
underscores the antipathy felt in the intelligence community towards senior members of the Administration since the run-up to the Gulf War. "It is the price we are paying for all that distrust." And Capitol Hill veterans notice the same attitude among Congressional Democrats. "They really believed, as did the authors of the NIE, that the Administration wanted again to go to war. Only this time they were determined not to be used." So determined were they to avoid being used says one State Department insider, that the authors of the NIE were, in his words,"...willing to risk another bumper sticker; this one saying `CIA Gets It Wrong Again,'" a reference to the intelligence community's failure to find out since 2003 that Iran had, at least, partly changed course. Equally upsetting to some in the Intelligence Community, say former officials, is the awareness that by going public with this NIE, they risk exposing their methods of collecting information to the Iranians and therefore letting them figure out exactly what the US does not know.
underscores the antipathy felt in the intelligence community towards senior members of the Administration since the run-up to the Gulf War. "It is the price we are paying for all that distrust." And Capitol Hill veterans notice the same attitude among Congressional Democrats. "They really believed, as did the authors of the NIE, that the Administration wanted again to go to war. Only this time they were determined not to be used." So determined were they to avoid being used says one State Department insider, that the authors of the NIE were, in his words,"...willing to risk another bumper sticker; this one saying `CIA Gets It Wrong Again,'" a reference to the intelligence community's failure to find out since 2003 that Iran had, at least, partly changed course. Equally upsetting to some in the Intelligence Community, say former officials, is the awareness that by going public with this NIE, they risk exposing their methods of collecting information to the Iranians and therefore letting them figure out exactly what the US does not know.
"...Left in the lurch by this intelligence "bombshell" are the Israelis. They have consistently subordinated their fight to
prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear capability to the US-led effort. In the view of US officials, not to mention the Israelis themselves, they are now alone with a military option "on the table." But like the Administration, Israel's pursuit of the diplomatic option was the best, if not the only alternative. Israeli military planners admit that even if their government were to order a military strike, there is no guarantee it would be effective. The Israelis say privately they do not know which of the many sites where nuclear work is conducted in Iran could constitute a bottleneck, the crippling of which would seriously retard its overall development. More important, Israel is aware of the impact unilateral military action would have on its international standing, especially with the US. Says one well-placed Israeli, "We know that Iran would retaliate, not just against us but against the US as well. And quite frankly, you
are more vulnerable than us."
"... As for pressuring Gulf Arab states and sheikdoms, like Dubai, Administration officials maintain that given the current financial climate, US leverage is not what it used to be. That is not to say that the Gulf states are not concerned about Iran's increased standing. But as one well-placed US official put it
this week, "They were already an easy sell." But this official admits that most Arabs were more than a bit confused by the NIE. "In their world the mukhabarat [intelligence services] are not exactly independent agencies." The only silver lining this official saw was, "Perhaps the Iranians are asking `What the heck is the US up to?.'" And he concludes, "We could well be on our way to a policy designed to confuse and contain."
"...Some observers say this characterization could be used to describe current Administration policy on other Middle East problems. In Lebanon, the US clearly went from major actor in the drama of selecting a new President to (in the words of one US official) "subcontracting the role to France." Now with an impending visit by Secretary Rice, there is the expectation that the US will once again attempt to buttress the dispirited pro- western politicians there. On the more important Arab-Israeli issue, the Administration appears to be trying to buy time, with what one State Department official calls "monthly activities" designed to contain the violent confrontations occurring daily between the Israeli military and Hamas controlled Gazans [What one well-placed Israeli calls "A train wreck waiting to happen."] After the November Annapolis meeting, there came the December "Donors' Conference " in Paris [Where, much to the Administration's chagrin the Gulf States once again disappointed with their relatively meager promises of assistance to Abu Mazen's fledgling Palestinian Authority]. In January President Bush will visit the region. "And then we will be only two events, I mean months, away from the next Arab summit," cracks one State Department official. That summit is slated for Damascus. And some Arabs (and not a few Israelis) see it as a an opportunity to further woo Syria away from its long time Iranian embrace."
prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear capability to the US-led effort. In the view of US officials, not to mention the Israelis themselves, they are now alone with a military option "on the table." But like the Administration, Israel's pursuit of the diplomatic option was the best, if not the only alternative. Israeli military planners admit that even if their government were to order a military strike, there is no guarantee it would be effective. The Israelis say privately they do not know which of the many sites where nuclear work is conducted in Iran could constitute a bottleneck, the crippling of which would seriously retard its overall development. More important, Israel is aware of the impact unilateral military action would have on its international standing, especially with the US. Says one well-placed Israeli, "We know that Iran would retaliate, not just against us but against the US as well. And quite frankly, you
are more vulnerable than us."
"... As for pressuring Gulf Arab states and sheikdoms, like Dubai, Administration officials maintain that given the current financial climate, US leverage is not what it used to be. That is not to say that the Gulf states are not concerned about Iran's increased standing. But as one well-placed US official put it
this week, "They were already an easy sell." But this official admits that most Arabs were more than a bit confused by the NIE. "In their world the mukhabarat [intelligence services] are not exactly independent agencies." The only silver lining this official saw was, "Perhaps the Iranians are asking `What the heck is the US up to?.'" And he concludes, "We could well be on our way to a policy designed to confuse and contain."
"...Some observers say this characterization could be used to describe current Administration policy on other Middle East problems. In Lebanon, the US clearly went from major actor in the drama of selecting a new President to (in the words of one US official) "subcontracting the role to France." Now with an impending visit by Secretary Rice, there is the expectation that the US will once again attempt to buttress the dispirited pro- western politicians there. On the more important Arab-Israeli issue, the Administration appears to be trying to buy time, with what one State Department official calls "monthly activities" designed to contain the violent confrontations occurring daily between the Israeli military and Hamas controlled Gazans [What one well-placed Israeli calls "A train wreck waiting to happen."] After the November Annapolis meeting, there came the December "Donors' Conference " in Paris [Where, much to the Administration's chagrin the Gulf States once again disappointed with their relatively meager promises of assistance to Abu Mazen's fledgling Palestinian Authority]. In January President Bush will visit the region. "And then we will be only two events, I mean months, away from the next Arab summit," cracks one State Department official. That summit is slated for Damascus. And some Arabs (and not a few Israelis) see it as a an opportunity to further woo Syria away from its long time Iranian embrace."
1 comment:
"And then we will be only two events, I mean months, away from the next Arab summit.."
Slip of the tongue or slip of policy methodology?
Should be interesting to keep an eye out for 2 major events between January and March
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