"... This week's rare glimpse into the Egoz Unit training exercise reveals how the ground forces commando prepares for close range combat against Hezbollah. The only knowledge these Egoz combat soldiers have of the Second Lebanon War is what they saw on their television screens. Most of them were in school during the battles of Bint Jbeil and Maroun al-Ras. This week, it was their turn to prepare for the next war, which could in many ways, be a lot like the battles of the summer of 2006.... A senior officer described the situation: "Hezbollah hasn't changed its method of operation, which includes munitions charges, anti-tank missiles, and guerilla fighting. Even though it carries out operations in residential areas, it knows how to operate in open areas, the thicket, and to fire rockets at civilians from there. These soldiers need to get to those places and attack.".... The IDF's working premise is that Hezbollah will try minimizing face to face combat as much as possible. "Not for nothing do they wrap themselves in detonators, rockets and obstacles; it is in order to avoid close combat. Their nightmare is to face the Egoz unit" says a senior officer. ..."
"... The “no’s” refer to a dramatic Arab summit in Sudan in 1967, when, after Israel’s crushing defeat of its neighbors, Arab states declared “no” to peace with Israel, “no” to negotiations with it, and “no” to recognition of it. Nasser, the Egyptian president, was the standard-bearer of a secular nationalism whose moment had ended with that war; today, Iran is, by choice or default, the scion of a generation of opposition politics that now alone bears an indelibly religious stamp.
In a region once convulsed by a potpourri of ideologies — from unreconstructed Maoists to millenarian Salafists — no one is left standing save Islamist movements, from Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood to Hamas in the Palestinian territories to Hezbollah, perhaps the most formidable. Be it opposition to Israel, to autocratic Arab regimes, or to the plethora of injustices visited on Arabs, the Islamists are the only ones with a broadly popular message and an ardent following, with a fleeting exception or two.
Their ascendancy is not new; for a generation, they have eclipsed their secular and leftist predecessors, whom they often act (and sometimes speak) like. But the legacy of their virtual monopoly on opposition is becoming more and more clear. They have reinterpreted conflicts — between Arab and Israeli, East and West — and have highlighted the degree to which the very notion of identity has shifted in the Arab world; so much so that “Arab” may soon become passé in defining that world. And with a politics bereft of ideology beyond faith, they have narrowed the avenues for change in a region whose inhabitants desperately want it. These movements often exude a canny pragmatism. Islamists in Turkey, Egypt, Lebanon and the Palestinian territories have all embraced electoral success; in time, they may even reinforce a democratic body politic. But on issues from poverty to Palestine, they have imposed a paradigm of morality, ethics and occasional absolutism that tends to neglect society’s most pressing problems or turn them into unrequitable anthems.....
“Radical” is a word journalists often deploy. So is “militant.” They are shorthand and, as such, do little to describe what today’s Islamist opposition really represents. “They are radical only in the sense that they reject Israeli hegemony in the region,” said Karim Makdisi, a professor at the American University of Beirut. Indeed, Hezbollah long ago set aside enforcement of social conservatism in Lebanon, for the sake of unifying its diverse constituency. While 25 years ago it called for an Islamic state along the lines of Iran, it is now firmly part of the prevailing sectarian order. Like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the Justice and Development Party in Turkey, it helps represent a rising middle class. “They are not against the state at all,” said Elias Khoury, a Lebanese writer and critic. “The only thing is that they want to dominate it in their own way.”
Their greatest legacy may be on the Arab-Israeli conflict, in which both Israel and its Islamist opponents have inexorably moved away from a struggle between competing nationalisms and toward a historic clash of religions — more messianic, more grounded in identities as Muslims and Jews and, in that, more dangerous. Bringing the sacred into the debate makes compromise altogether more difficult. Jewish fundamentalism against Islamic fundamentalism, Mr. Khoury called it: “That is a sign of catastrophe, and this is the situation we’re in now.”..."
"....Druze leader Walid Jumblat on Sunday discussed with Syrian President Bashar Assad efforts to defuse Lebanon tensions and consolidate unity, the state-run National News Agency said. It said the meeting dealt with "the latest developments on the Lebanese arena and the importance of concerted efforts of all Lebanese parties to maintain calm and consolidate national unity so as to face the challenges that may confront it in the future. Jumblat said Sunday morning, just before heading to Damascus, that Syria and Saudi Arabia are currently considering ways to resolve the crisis over the International Tribunal Indictment. "I heard that the indictment has been postponed till March," Jumblat said during a political meeting in the town of Aanout in Iqlim al-Kharroub. He said Lebanon cannot wait till March to relaunch crisis talks. "Delaying the indictment means delaying the problem ..... And I know that Syria and Saudi Arabia are now considering ways to deal with this issue," Jumblat uncovered. Turning to the issue of false witnesses, Jumblat believed that voting on this issue will lead to a "big dilemma .... Justice and stability have to go together .... This is my motto." Jumblat said he has conveyed this to U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Jeffrey Feltman during his visit to Lebanon last week."We discussed points of disagreement, and I told him why don't we together look for other hypotheses. Of course, he (Feltman) refused," he said...."
"...For a generation, Bandar bin Sultan was Riyadh's man in Washington. ... Bandar's disappearance prompted a number of conspiracy theories. The Iranian media, for example, has rather creatively accused him of masterminding al Qaeda's activities in Iraq and funding al Qaeda-affiliated Sunni Islamist groups in Lebanon in an attempt to undermine Hezbollah. And then, around 2008, Bandar vanished from the public eye. Exactly what caused Bandar to fall out of political favor remains unclear, but he had acquired no shortage of enemies, even within the royal family, over his long tenure as the principal contact between Saudi Arabia and its most important ally.
But now, Bandar is back. A brief Saudi Press Agency story last week reported: "Prince Muqrin bin Abdul Aziz, Chief of Saudi Intelligence, welcomed Prince Bandar home at the airport." Prince Muqrin was joined in welcoming Bandar by a virtual who's who of Saudi political figures: Prince Khalid bin Sultan; Prince Muhammad bin Naif; Prince Abdul Aziz bin Fahd; Prince Faisal bin Khalid bin Sultan; Prince Salman bin Sultan. According to the Saudi Press Agency, "more senior princes" were also in attendance. That's one helluva welcome, by any standard. By Saudi standards, it is enormous: an uncle, a half brother, three significant cousins, and a nephew, never mind the unnamed senior princes. The report said he had arrived "from abroad," but gave no further details. There wasn't even a photo, though one report says he has lost a considerable amount of weight.
So what's going on? First, a word of caution. There is an old saw that people who actually know what is going on in the Saudi royal family don't talk about it -- and people who talk about it don't know what is going on. ...... we'll never know as much as we'd like about the kingdom's opaque politics.
Bandar has struggled with his health for years, recently undergoing two operations at the Johns Hopkins Hospital in Baltimore. The most prosaic explanation for his return is that, after convalescing in Morocco, where his father, Crown Prince Sultan, is vacationing, he has recovered and has now come home. His most likely ailment is a bad back, though two biographies in recent years have reported that Bandar has also had problems with alcohol and depression....
But there appears to be more to Bandar's return to the kingdom than just improved health. The buzz, from a well-placed source (see above: "people who talk about it don't know") close to the royal family, is that it has to do with the internal politics of the House of Saud and the vexing questions of royal succession: Who will take the throne after King Abdullah, and who will be the king after that? Bandar's talents for political deal-making have, supposedly, caused the royal family to overlook his reputation for self-interested decision-making and a certain lack of respect for many of his uncles. Despite an outward facade of stability, the House of Saud is in turmoil over succession. King Abdullah is 87 this year, but his half brother and designated successor, Crown Prince Sultan, is 86. To put it kindly, though Sultan can still stand, life is essentially one long senior moment -- he will never be capable of running the country. The apparent next in line is Sultan's full brother, Prince Nayef, 77, the hard-line minister of interior, best known for publicly claiming the 9/11 attacks were carried out by Jews. But the turmoil goes far beyond the monarchy's top ranks. It is increasingly apparent that Abdullah and the 19 other surviving sons of King Abdul Aziz, are either too old or do not have the experience or acumen to manage the affairs of the kingdom .....
There is, according to sources within the royal family, a deal emerging. The sequence of events is not clear, but changes could start soon. First, Crown Prince Sultan will give up his long-held post of defense minister, handing the portfolio to his son (and Bandar's half brother), Prince Khalid bin Sultan, (whose) leadership during the recent skirmishes against rebels in the border area with Yemen was marked by a series of tactical blunders. ...
A second change will be the retirement of Prince Saud al-Faisal, 69, the son of the late King Faisal, as foreign minister. Saud, an Arab nationalist, was once described in an official British briefing document as "very bright but perhaps not so bright as he thinks." He suffers from Parkinson's disease as well as a bad back and in photos often appears as though he is in agony. The foreign-minister position will go, the sources say, to Saud's younger brother Turki al-Faisal, 65 -- keeping it, in feudal style, in the hands of the al-Faisal branch of the family. Prince Turki served for many years as the Saudi intelligence chief until he was sacked in 2001 -- 10 days before the 9/11 attacks -- and then later as a successful ambassador to Britain before his short-lived and disastrous stint in Washington. Turki will once again be rehabilitated because he has intellectual talents and worldly connections that are in short supply in the royal family.
The changing of the guard will also reach the throne: Saud and Turki's 69-year-old brother Khalid (not to be confused with the crown prince's militarily hapless son Khalid) will most likely emerge as a future king. Khalid is a poet, an enthusiastic painter, and a friend of Britain's Prince Charles. He previously served as governor of the mountainous and politically volatile province of Asir and is the current governor of the holy province of Mecca. Most importantly for his political future, Khalid has emerged as a figure respected by the various factions within the family, able to guide the kingdom forward with a steady hand.
As always, there are a few loose ends in this scenario. Prince Nayef is expected to be made crown prince upon Sultan's death or even before. However, he is said to be still recovering from a bout of cancer, which could mean he would not become king. His full brother Salman, 74, the governor of Riyadh province and every foreign ambassador's favorite to be king, is also apparently disqualified by a weak heart.
Bandar's exact role remains to be seen. As the son of a former slave girl in his father's court, he lacks the pedigree to be king himself. But he is married to an al-Faisal princess, and his connections in Washington make him a valuable ally for any would-be monarch. Within the family, he can explain the folly of internal royal dissension in a region increasingly threatened by Iran. Amid all the rumors and innuendo, insiders agree on one concrete fact: Bandar is back as a player in Saudi politics. ..."
"... The IMF recorded growth in Syria of 4% in 2009, and expects that to increase to 5% this year. Nonetheless, high unemployment underpinned by rapid population growth and falling oil revenues continue to cloud the outlook.
Foreign investment. The outlook for foreign investment has brightened. The International Finance Corporation (IFC), the World Bank's private-sector lending arm, expects investment in the power sector to act as a precursor to greater private investment in other infrastructure projects. The government is also working to end US sanctions, which have deterred many foreign investments. In the meantime, Syria will continue to benefit from petrodollar-rich Gulf Arab investors, who are comfortable with the country's political risk profile and look to invest in the Middle East. According to the Ministry of Local Administration, investment in Syria's four industrial cities increased by almost 70% year-on-year to reach 441.7 billion Syrian pounds (9.4 billion dollars) by mid-2010. Of this, almost 25% was from non-Syrian companies.
Lack of framework. Despite these trends, foreign investors still face problems. The country has yet to establish a coherent framework for foreign investment. The government's attitude is shaped by caution and hesitation, with decisions being made out of necessity and on a case-by-case basis. This was seen most recently with Decree no. 56 issued in July and aimed at regulating the creation and operation of investment banks:
1. Necessity. The government was forced into devising a law due to the need of the cement industry -- traditionally under public sector monopoly -- for financial resources. In November 2009, Bank Audi had arranged with syndicates for a 340 million dollar project-finance facility for Lafarge Cement Syria. This provided partial funding for the first private greenfield cement plant in Syria, with a production capacity of 2.75 million tons per annum. It also meant that investment banking activity in the country needed to be regulated.
2. Ambivalence. The decree reflects official ambivalence towards foreign investment: The government claims that it will deepen the financial system and attract more investment into the private sector. Yet the decree stipulates that banks have a minimum capital requirement (MCR) of 435 million dollars, far outstripping the requirements of investment banks in neighbouring countries. When licences were initially offered in 1997, MCRs depended on the services being offered, with the highest amount of 6.8 million dollars only required for banks underwriting share rights issues. Yet the new requirement disqualifies Egyptian banks, H.C. Securities and EFG Hermes, both which had been granted licences to set up in Syria....
Damascus seems keen to emulate the Chinese model of financing of allowing a few investment banks to operate as long as they are outnumbered by government-owned banks. Minister of Trade and Economy Lamia Assi called last month for the establishment of a Syrian-Chinese bank to finance infrastructure projects in the country. By limiting the number of banks, it will be easier for the government to monitor activity and to intervene to direct finance. However, Syria does not have the resources of China to follow through a policy of controlled capitalism with bureaucratic intervention.
Business environment. Syria needs to do more to boost its regional competitiveness: According to the IFC's Ease of Doing Business 2010 report, Syria's world ranking of 143 is the second-lowest in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) economies, followed only by Iraq. Worse, Syria has slipped down from its previous rank of 138, in contrast to regional competitors Egypt, Morocco, Jordan and Tunisia, which all recorded improved rankings.
Limits to privatisation. Although the government wants to attract investment into some sectors, widespread privatisation is unlikely due to concerns about income inequalities. With around 35% of the total workforce employed by the government, restructuring would mean heavy job losses.
Evidence from other MENA economies which have pursued privatisation is mixed. According to the Gini index, a standard method of measuring inequalities: Jordan has become significantly more unequal; inequality in Morocco has increased, though less so; while Tunisia has become slightly less unequal....
Lack of skills. Investment will also suffer from the lack of individuals with the necessary technical and motivational skills to build up the private sector, such as the risk management expertise required in the new Syrian investment banks ... Syrian students predominately travel to other Arab countries or mainland Europe to study, rather than the United States, Australia or the United Kingdom. Syria suffers a brain drain as educated people seek greater remuneration and opportunities in other, more meritocratic, economies. Compulsory military service (although there are exemptions) can also deter qualified individuals from returning.
Political context. For the private sector to flourish, political reform is required, and this the government is unwilling to undertake. A new contract between state and the people would need to be established with greater representation, transparency and debate offered in exchange for taxation. This is still a long way off ..... In addition, apparently nepotistic business practices, such as the ownership of Syriatel by Rami Makhlouf, cousin of President Bashar al-Assad, would need to be curbed so as to open the way fully for greater private sector activity. .."
"...Two days after the United States unveiled an arms deal with estimated at $60 billion, one of Riyadh’s leading figures blasted the US for not living up to its commitments in the current Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and not doing more to reign in Israel. “It has failed to curb the brutal Israeli policy of collective punishment, arbitrary arrests and killings,” charged Prince , former Saudi ambassador to the US and director of Saudi intelligence. He also criticized some American officials for not standing up to Israel, maintaining, “It is these officials who propose that the Netanyahu government should be rewarded for its intransigence rather than sanctioned.” ..."
وقالت المصادر إن حزب الله من بين الجهات التي تبلغت الأمر، وإن الحديث يدور حول رسالة نقلتها السعودية الى دمشق بصورة شبه رسمية قبل فترة وجيزة تفيد بأن الأجواء في مجلس الامن وفي المحكمة الدولية تشير الى أن بلمار لن يصدر قراره الاتهامي قبل آذار المقبل، وأن مزيداً من الأبحاث التي سيجريها فريق التحقيق التابع له تتطلب وقتاً إضافياً. وتأتي هذه المعلومات وسط «تسريبات هي الاولى من نوعها صادرة عن جهات استخبارية عربية وغربية بارزة، بينها الاستخبارات الأردنية، ترى أنّ فرضية وقوف أصوليّين مقرّبين من فكر «القاعدة» خلف الجريمة أقوى بكثير من اتهام حزب الله، رغم أنّ جهات عربية وغربية أخرى ما زالت تصرّ على أن عناصر
غير منضبطة من حزب الله قد تكون وراء العملية
(Translation) Semi-official Saudi Arabian sources recently informed Syria that Prosecutor in the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, Daniel Bellemare, is expected to postpone issuing the indictment in the investigation into the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri until March, reported Al-Akhbar Saturday from informed sources. They added that prominent Lebanese sides have also been informed of this in recent days.
They attributed the delay to further research needed by the international investigation. The paper added that the possible postponement came amid new reports from prominent Arab (Jordan's) and western intelligence that extremists similar to Al-Qaida may have been behind Hariri's assassination and not Hizbullah...."
MEPGS's take:The Obama Administration is trying desperately to keep the Israeli-Palestinian talks from collapsing. Since the end of last month when Israel's ten month partial freeze on new settlement activity ended, the Palestinians have refused to meet face-to- face with the Israelis and the Israeli government of Benjamin Netanyahu has resisted repeated entreaties from the US to resume the freeze, even briefly. Actively working the "back channel" on this issue is veteran Middle East negotiator Dennis Ross, who, according to well-informed sources has been in regular contact with Netanyahu confidante, Yitzhak Molcho.Meanwhile, frustrated Palestinian officials are threatening to take an "international route" whereby they would seek recognition of their state in the absence of an agreement with Israel ..... However, US officials are adamant in their opposition to this unilateral Palestinian move. If such an approach is mooted at the UN Security Council, it is certain to be met with a veto by the US, say well-placed Administration official. These officials say that ultimately the Palestinians will back off these attempts, including one which the US could not prevent -- a UN General Assembly vote in favor of a Palestinian state.Instead US officials are betting that Ross and others working this issue will gain a temporary halt to new Israeli construction, although they expect the price to be high for Israeli acquiescence. Among the "rewards" Netanyahu is reportedly seeking is the release of Jonathan Pollard .... Should a Pollard or other more substantive inducements [such as increased military aid] succeed in enticing Netanyahu into reviving a settlement freeze, the Administration is expected to "force the deal down the Palestinians" throats, to use a less than felicitous phrase uttered by a veteran State Department insider this week. But as this official and other observers then ask, if rhetorically, "What next?" For many inside the Administration who follow this issue closely, there really is no long range plan. As one key State Department official put it this week, "All we are trying to do is keep the ball in the air."A lack of detailed Administration planning is also a salient feature these days of US policy towards Lebanon. Despite efforts by a number of Administration officials to downplay the significance of Iranian President Ahmaninejad's highly publicized visit to Lebanon ["He drew smaller than expected crowds," said one US official. "His Israeli-bashing scored just a few transient points," said another], the Administration quickly diverted its top Middle East expert, Assistant Secretary of State Jeffrey Feltman to a brief stopover in Beirut. Unfortunately this "showing of the flag' (one Administration official's phrase) did little to dispel the high anxiety felt by many Lebanese over the expected issuance of indictments by an international tribunal for the arrest of Hezbollah operatives for complicity in the murder of former Lebanese President Rafik Hariri. His son, Saad, currently Lebanon's Prime Minister is expected to feel Hezbollah's wrath, should members of their powerful organization be indicted.
However, Feltman and other US officials appear to be offering little comfort to the pro-Western Saad. The official US line is that the International Tribunal is an independent actor with the US unable to influence its actions -- even if it wanted to. US officials also seem to be rather indifferent to the consequences to Saad either politically or even physically of Tribunal action and possible Hezbollah retribution.While the Administration is far from indifferent to the outcome of the months long deliberations in Baghdad over the formation of a new government there, here to, they do not seem to be focused on a well-defined "game plan." Similar to its approach to Lebanon, the Administration has been quick to offer political bromides, such as repeated calls for an "all-inclusive" government. This refers to the US preference for a government in which the Sunnis would have a substantive role. ..... However, recently Iran "made its move" [to quote one European diplomat] by successfully enlisting the support for Maliki by the party of the radical anti-American cleric, Muktada al-Sadr. The US responded by publicly stating its opposition to the "Sadrists" gaining an important foothold in any incoming Iraqi government. Privately, say US officials, newly installed Ambassador James Jeffrey as well as other US officials including, notably Vice President Biden have been actively lobbying for an "acceptable" government. Their goal, it seems, has been to promote the creation of a power sharing agreement that would see Allawi as President and Maliki returning as Prime Minister, but with reduced powers. Yet, State Department insiders consider that outcome as having about a one in three chance of success, with the more likely result being the one most feared -- a government without significant Sunni participation.Should an overwhelmingly Shia dominated government emerge, it will be seen as a victory for Iran, admit key US officials. And this would come at a most inopportune time for the Administration. Currently, US officials are still in a self- congratulatory mood over the increased political isolation and economic pressure the regime in Teheran has come under. Despite reports that talks in Beijing have not resulted in any progress in gaining support from the Chinese for additional economic pressure on Iran, US officials note that there have been no signs that Chinese companies have been "back filling " or taking advantage of European and Japanese cutbacks in business with Iran.Key US officials argue that Teheran's willingness to engage in talks about Afghanistan is another sign of political unease among its leadership. And shortly, the US expects to get a definitive answer from Teheran to a proposed meeting to discuss Iran's nuclear program. Likely to be held in Geneva, perhaps as early as next month and limited to the issue of its uranium enrichment program, Iran would face the US, the other four permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany in moving to this, the next planned step towads reining in Iran's nuclear ambitions.
"... On September 11, 2001, 15 Saudis, one Egyptian, one Lebanese and two citizens of the United Arab Emirates crashed hijacked airliners into American targets, murdering close to 3,000 people. All 19 were Sunni Muslims, followers of a puritanical strain of Islam developed in Saudi Arabia and Egypt. The ideology of jihad that lures recruits from the suburbs of London to the hinterlands of Waziristan is promulgated by Sunni Imams and financed overwhelmingly (if indirectly) by the Persian Gulf monarchies.
The two architects of 9/11 and the masterminds of the global jihadist movement - Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri - are Saudi and Egyptian, respectively. The captured "enemy combatants" that were locked away in Guantanamo Bay hail from Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Syria and even Australia. There is not a single Iranian among them. Nor have there been any Iranians implicated in the recent terrorist plots uncovered in Europe and the U.S. If there is going to be a terrorist attack inside the U.S. it will almost certainly originate either from Pakistan or the Persian Gulf. It will almost certainly not be sponsored or perpetrated by the government of Iran.
So naturally, we need to help defend Saudi Arabia.
And look, it's preferable to starting a war with Iran, but the trajectory of America's relationships with the countries that had the most direct role in incubating and fomenting the terrorism that slaughtered thousands of Americans and continues to threaten the West is an enduring curiosity. To put it mildly...."
