Monday, November 29, 2010

Wikileaks [11]: Gulf Arabs "believe Israel can work magic..."


VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTV #0654/01 0781437
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 191437Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1038
INFO RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI PRIORITY 5175
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 5680
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0150
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 3724
RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA PRIORITY 0904
RUEHKU/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT PRIORITY 0651
RUEHMK/AMEMBASSY MANAMA PRIORITY 0930
RUEHMS/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT PRIORITY 0001
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH PRIORITY 2225
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY 1690
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
S E C R E T TEL AVIV 000654 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/19/2019 
TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV KWBG IR IS
SUBJECT: ISRAEL'S RELATIONS WITH THE GULF STATES FOCUS ON 
IRAN, PERCEPTION OF ISRAELI INFLUENCE IN WASHINGTON 
 
REF: TEL AVIV 605 
 
Classified By: DCM Luis G. Moreno, Reason 1.4 (b) (d) 
 
1.  (S) Summary.  MFA Deputy Director General for the Middle 
East Yacov Hadas provided PolCouns March 16 with an overview 
of Israel's relations with several of the Gulf states.  Hadas 
described Israel's relations with the Gulf as a function of 
the Gulf Arabs' fear of Iran, but also as due to the Arabs' 
belief in Israeli influence in Washington.  Fleshing out some 
of the points he had made earlier to NEA Acting A/S Feltman 
(reftel),... 
 
3.  (S) While Hadas was critical of the Qataris' treatment of 
Israel since the Gaza operation, he stressed that he thought 
Qatar's policies were not a matter of a shift in ideology 
toward the radical camp, but linked to their rivalry with the 
Saudis and, by extension, with Egypt.  In private settings, 
Hadas noted that the Qatari leadership harbored "no 
illusions" about Iran.  Prince Hamad had told the Israelis in 
October 2006 that he believed Iran was determined to develop 
a nuclear bomb no matter the cost.  According to Hadas, Hamad 
complained at the time that he felt the U.S. would not listen 
to him and tended to believe what it heard from Iran. 
 
4.  (S) Hadas reiterated the point he had made to Feltman 
regarding Oman, calling the Omanis the "most problematic" of 
the Gulf states in terms of their view of Iran... He did not think Oman would be 
willing to join the rest of the GCC against Iran. 
 
5.  (S) Hadas agreed that the UAE was increasingly hostile to 
Iran, but there remained a question as to how far they were 
prepared to go.  The UAE has extensive trade and financial 
relations with Iran, including money laundering, and it was 
unclear whether they were ready to use these relations as 
leverage.  Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdallah has developed 
good personal relations with Foreign Minister Livni, but the 
Emiratis are "not ready to do publicly what they say in 
private."  (Note:  It was clear from Hadas' remarks that 
Israel's channel to Saudi Arabia does not run through the 
Foreign Ministry.) 
 
6.  (S) Hadas said the Gulf Arabs believe in Israel's role 
because of their perception of Israel's close relationship 
with the U.S. but also due to their sense that they can count 
on Israel against Iran.  "They believe Israel can work 
magic,"... 
 
7.  (C) PolCouns noted that Arabs say that progress on the 
Palestinian track would make it easier for them to publicly 
engage Israel.  Hadas countered that while peace with the 
Palestinians is an Israeli interest and important in its own 
right, it should not be the sum total of Israel's relations 
with the Arab World.  Arab League Secretary General Amre 
Moussa had invented the "never-ending hurdle race" in which 
Israel could never do enough to deserve a positive response. 
The Israeli-Palestinian track should not serve as an excuse 
for the Gulf to avoid action, whether against Iran or through 
practical steps to support the Palestinian Authority. 

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