Friday, February 5, 2010

Why did EFG-Hermes want a larger share in AUDI-Saradar?

The reality of the matter is that the Egyptians wanted a (60+%) politically-explosive increased share in AUDI ... Basically, AUDI holds the biggest share (by a local bank) in the Lebanese national debt, ... and Lebanon's powers-to-be 'leaned' heavily on Salameh to trip the Egyptians. Little things like pressures from a regime that has many chips against Lebanon's powers-to-be, tilted the decision!

Business Week/ here

The Beirut-based company paid around $450 million for half the EFG-Hermes’ stake, Chief Executive Officer Azmi Mikati said in an interview in his office today.

Bank Audi has “great potential and is the leading financial institution in Lebanon growing at a very rapid pace,” Mikati said. “It has the potential of a platform to further expand in the region.”

EFG-Hermes, the biggest publicly traded Arab investment bank, sold its stake on Jan. 18 in Bank Audi, Lebanon’s largest lender by assets, for $913 million after giving up the possibility of acquiring a bigger stake. Half was sold to a group of existing shareholders and other individuals, none of whom own more than 5 percent each of Bank Audi, according to a filing with the Beirut Stock Exchange on Jan. 18....

The central bank “wanted everybody to know that if you invest in Lebanon and want to exit you can do it and do it smoothly,” Salameh said at the time.

“The main element for us was stability in the banking sector, its reputation, because we don’t want foreign investors to be stuck in any investment in Lebanon.”

Salameh declined to comment on whether the central bank had bought shares in Bank Audi for about $154 million, as reported by the Beirut-based Al-Akhbar newspaper last month. Lebanese law forbids Salameh from speaking about activities of the central bank’s clients, and all the banks in Lebanon are the clients of the central bank, he said...."


Judge Cassese: "... Hariri case highly complex ..."

"...All acts of terrorism are much more complicated than war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide" reads 'Truth' is light years away!
GulfNews, here

"... The assassination of Lebanese former prime minister Rafiq Hariri is extremely complex and there will be no deadlines in issuing indictments on the case, Antonio Cassese of the UN-backed Special Tribunal for Lebanon told the press. ... "All acts of terrorism are much more complicated than war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide," he said. Cassese arrived in Lebanon on Monday for a week-long visit aimed at gathering information for the ongoing investigation, but admitted in the difficulties behind investigating political assassinations...."

For the last 16 years- under Bill Clinton & George W. Bush - America has been in a diplomatic dry patch ..."

In FP/ here

"... America never ran the world (an illusion the left, right, and much of the third and fourth worlds believe); but there were moments (1945-1950, the early 1970s, 1988-1991) when the United States marshaled its military, political, and economic power toward impressive ends.....

For most of the last 16 years, however -- under Bill Clinton and George W. Bush -- America has been in a diplomatic dry patch. In the face of terrorism, nuclear proliferation, wars of choice, and nasty regional conflicts, conventional diplomacy has either not been tried or not been very successful. The image of the shuttling secretary of state pre-empting crises or exploiting them to broker agreements, doggedly pursuing Middle East peace, achieving dramatic breakthroughs with spectacular secret diplomacy seems a world away.

The Obama administration wants to do this kind of stuff. And it has done pretty well in managing the big relationships with Russia and Europe, though it has had its share of problems with China. But frankly, these are the easy ones. It's not from the big that the president's problems come; it's from the small.

In garden spots like Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen, and Somalia, the problems are four parts military, five parts nation-building, and maybe one part diplomacy. And America is unlikely to prevail in any meaningful sense of the word where corrupt, extractive regimes are unable to control their own territory and cut deals with anti-American elements and place their security and political concerns first.

Even in areas where diplomacy might seem to work on paper -- Kashmir, Arab-Israeli peacemaking -- the United States is hampered by conflicts driven by deep ethnic and religious hostility and by internal politics in which its own allies (Israel, Pakistan, and India) can't be of much help. And in one of the cruelest ironies of all, the U.S. president who has gone further to engage Iran than any of his predecessors is watching any hope for diplomacy being ground up by a regime under siege in Tehran...."

(more/ here)

Muqrin & Sleiman ...

Thursday, February 4, 2010

"200 US troops in Pakistan ... a whole lot more than Holbrooke's 'no American troops in Pakistan'...

Danger Room/ here
The U.S. military has 200 troops on the ground in Pakistan. That’s about the double the previouslydisclosed number of forces there. It’s a whole lot more than the “no American troops in Pakistan” promised by special envoy Richard Holbrooke. And let’s not even get into the number of U.S. intelligence operatives and security contractors on Pakistani soil.
The troop levels are one of a number of details that have emerged about the once-secret U.S. war in Pakistan since three American troops were killed yesterday by an improvised bomb. The New York Times reports that the soldiers were disguised in Pakistani clothing, and their vehicle was outfitted with radio-frequency jammers, meant to stop remotely-detonated bombs. “Still, the Taliban bomber was able to penetrate their cordon. ...
The slain U.S. troops have been referred to alternately as Special Operations forces as and as “civil affairs” troops — military nation-builders. It’s quite possible they were both. American forces “have been quietly working on development projects” in Pakistan. It’s supposedly part of an effort to train local forces in population-centric counterinsurgency. But the effort has been kept low-key, out of fears that it could hand the Taliban a propaganda win. “Last summer, for example, the American military trainers helped distribute food and water in camps for the more than one million people displaced from the Swat Valley by the fighting [there]. But that American assistance, too, was kept quiet.”
But keeping the American involvement secret — only to have it revealed in such dramatic fashion — may give militants an even bigger propaganda victory. “People are going to be very suspicious,” said Khalid Aziz, a former chief secretary of the North-West Frontier Province. “There is going to be big blowback in the media.”

On Hezbollah, "Dennis Blair makes a dramatic shift..."

Via FP/Pass/ here in Democracy Arsenal/ here

Buried beneath all the cybertastic stuff in this year's DNI threat assessment are a few surprising lines about Hizballah:

We judge that, unlike al-Qa’ida, Hizballah, which has not directly attacked US interests overseas over the past 13 years, is not now actively plotting to strike the Homeland. However, we cannot rule out that the group would attack if it perceives that the US is threatening its core interests.

Why is this so striking? Let's start with the fact that the last few threat assessments have grouped Hizballah together with Al Qaeda as a major terrorist threat to the United States:

In addition to al-Qaida, its networks and affiliates, I mention the terrorist threat from Hizballah, which is backed by Iran and Syria. As a result of last summer's hostilities, Hizballah's self confidence and hostility toward the US as a supporter of Israel could cause the group to increase its contingency planning against US interests.

Terrorist groups—including al-Qa’ida, HAMAS, and Hizballah—have expressed the desire to use cyber means to target the United States.

Lebanese Hizballah continues to be a formidable terrorist adversary with an ability to attack the US Homeland and US interests abroad.

By taking pains to emphasize that Hizballah is not a direct threat to the United States, Blair makes a dramatic tonal shift. This raises some big questions. What caused the intelligence community to so radically alter its perspective? Does Blair's assessment suggest further revisiting of U.S. policy toward a group that has steadily evolved from a militia to a major political actor in Lebanon? What might that look like? We shall see.

Arab states' connect: "monarchies & life-long presidencies face common internal & external challenges, work closely on "intelligence & security"

OxfAn: Excerpts:
"...Arab nationalism, or Arabism -- a sense of shared nationhood and identity -- was a creation of the colonial period in the Middle East after the First World War. Related to pan-Arabism -- the aspiration for political union -- it owed its strength to historical, cultural and linguistic factors as well as a widely shared belief that the Arab world had been artificially divided by the Western powers and could only defend itself properly by finding a way to overcome these divisions. Lack of consensus. However, there was never a workable consensus as to how Arab nationalism should be expressed at the political level:
  • The League of Arab States (or Arab League), founded in 1945, was an uneasy compromise between the larger states such as Egypt and Iraq, who wanted a strong form of cooperation, and weaker ones such as Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait who feared political and economic domination by more powerful neighbours.
  • Such fears heightened when former Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser took up the Arab nationalist cause, appealing to the peoples of the Arab world over the heads of their leaders, and then dominated Egypt's three-year political union with Syria from 1958.
  • The cause was dealt a further blow as a result of the comprehensive and humiliating defeat of the Arab armies by the Israelis in 1967, after which the surviving Arab regimes chose to reduce their exposure to an ideology that seemed threatening to their own political survival.
The result was a type of political balancing act, as each regime sought to preserve its own independence while finding non-threatening ways of demonstrating the Arab credentials on which its popular legitimacy still depended. Manifestations of local sovereignty, and growing divisions over particular issues (such as the wars in the Gulf), meant that projects for greater cooperation languished.
Alternative paths.
The end of attempts at total political union paved the way for various experiments in sub-regional unity. Of these, the first and most successful has been the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), established in 1981. This was followed by the revival of an earlier attempt at an Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) embracing Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia in 1989 and the very short-lived Arab Cooperation Council (ACC) consisting of Egypt, Iraq, Jordan and North Yemen in the same year.
All such unions have focused on greater economic integration on the lines of the European Common Market. However, all have ended in a large measure of failure for a variety of significant reasons, including:
  • the unwillingness of regimes and their crony allies to abandon control over large parts of their own economies
  • the lack of the complementarities needed to promote increased trade -- including oil, as important non-oil states (notably Syria and Egypt) began to exploit their own mineral resources;
  • the pull of rival schemes for partial economic unions -- for example, the US-supported Qualified Industrial Zones scheme between Israel, Palestine, Jordan and, later, Egypt, or the EU's Mediterranean Initiative; and
  • the global opportunities provided by membership of the WTO.
Official Arabism today. In spite of the stress on individual national sovereignty, the separate Arab states remain connected in more significant ways than other parts of the non-European world. These include:
  • the ties of language, culture, history and religion which, although more tenuous as far as the states of North Africa are concerned, are still a significant part of regime legitimacy due in part to their continued resonance in popular thinking and experience;
  • systems of monarchical or life-long presidential government with similar centralised structures, all of which face common internal and external challenges and work closely with their military and security advisers
  • the inter-connectedness provided by flows of oil and gas and the presence of several million workers of Arab origin in the oil states; and
  • the exploitation of geographical proximity to connect power grids, natural gas pipelines, and systems of transport, particularly between Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon, as well as with increasingly important economic neighbours such as Turkey.
Unofficial Arabism. The people of the Arab world are deeply connected by an unofficial web of ties, including student movement between different Arab universities, creation of Arab think tanks, intra-Arab tourism, Arab professional associations and so on. There are also the remains of a vocal Arab intellectual and cultural elite which shares a common language of Arab nationalism, demonstrated in their journalism, novels and poems, as well as more formal expressions of Arab nationalism demonstrated in the local contributions to documents such as the UN Development Programme's Arab Development Report.
Other ties that have become of great significance in recent years include:
  • what might be called the 'September 11 effect', by which Arab investors prefer to keep their money in the Arab world rather than risk having it seized in European and US banks on account of its alleged use to support 'terrorism';
  • the impact of specifically 'Arab' television stations such as Al-Jazeera (launched 1996) which concentrate on specifically pan-Arab themes such as the Palestinian cause, inter-state relations, divisions between rival pan-Arab and Islamic ideologies and so on;
  • the development of what has been called an Arab 'blogosphere' which has created a new public sphere for the discussion of Arab-centered ideas and experiences, notably a fear of splits (for example, between Sunnis and Shias) and a shared sense of the need to confront censorship and to fight political apathy; and
  • an Arab audience for films and especially television serials such as those broadcast during the month of Ramadan which deal with common historical themes. ...
There can be little doubt that many of the ties which bind the Arab world together will continue, and in many instances, multiply during the 21st century. This, in turn, will provide both a space and an opportunity for economic, commercial and cultural expression which does not require a formal structure of treaties and of agreement to create new inter-governmental institutions. However, governments will maintain the present practice of informal cooperation without being willing to commit themselves to anything which places significant restraints on their sovereignty.

"... Israel has defrauded Palestinians of more than US$2 billion..."

Cook in the
National/ here
Over the past four decades Israel has defrauded Palestinians working inside Israel of more than US$2 billion (Dh7.4bn) by deducting from their salaries contributions for welfare benefits to which they were never entitled, Israeli economists revealed this week ....... After the recent easing of restrictions on entering Israel under the “economic peace” promised by Benjamin Netanyahu, the Israeli prime minister, nearly 50,000 Palestinians from the West Bank are working in Israel and continue to have such contributions docked from their pay.

Complicit in the deception, the report adds, is the Histadrut, the Israeli labour federation, which levies a monthly fee on Palestinian workers, even though they are not entitled to membership and are not represented in labour disputes.

“This is a clear-cut case of theft from Palestinian workers on a grand scale,” said Shir Hever, a Jerusalem-based economist and one of the authors of the report. “There are no reasons for Israel to delay in returning this money either to the workers or their beneficiaries.

The deductions started being made in 1970, three years after the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories began, ........

The Israeli organisations assess that the workers were defrauded of at least $2.25bn in today’s prices, in what they describe as a minimum and “very conservative” estimate of the misappropriation of the funds. Such a sum represents about 10 per cent of the PA’s annual budget.

China's 'warning' on Iran sanctions ...

AFP/ here

Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi warned on Thursday that threatening more sanctions against Iran will derail diplomatic efforts to resolve the dispute over Tehran's nuclear programme.

"This talk of sanctions at this moment will complicate the situation and stand in the way of finding a diplomatic solution," Yang told a gathering at a French think-tank.

China, a member of the UN Security Council, has called for more dialogue with Tehran, clashing with France and the United States which are seeking to move toward sanctions.

Yang was due to meet President Nicolas Sarkozy later Thursday for talks that were expected to touch on calls for tightening sanctions on Iran for its refusal to stop enriching uranium...Yang argued that Iran had not "totally shut the door" to efforts by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to negotiate a deal that would address concerns about its enrichment programme.

French Prime Minister Francois Fillon said Wednesday he would ask the United Nations to adopt a new resolution against Iran that would include "strong sanctions". US Defence Secretary Robert Gates also said Iran faces the prospect of "severe sanctions" from the UN Security Council and also directly from Western countries.

Hersh: "Syria is sharing intelligence on terrorism with the CIA & Britain’s MI6 after a request from Obama .."

I spoke to Bashar Assad, the president of Syria, this winter in Damascus....

One note: a transcript of our talk, provided by Assad’s office, was generally accurate but it did not include an exchange we had about intelligence. A senior Syrian official had told me that, last year, Syria, which is on the State Department’s list of state sponsors of terrorism, had renewed its sharing of intelligence on terrorism with the C.I.A. and with Britain’s MI6, after a request from Obama that was relayed by George Mitchell, the President’s envoy for the Middle East. (The White House declined to comment.) Assad said that he had agreed to do so, and then added that he also has warned Mitchell “that if nothing happens from the other side”—in terms of political progress—“we will stop it.”

Sy Hersh In the NYorker/ here

President Barack Obama:

Bush gave Obama this big ball of fire, and it is burning, domestically and internationally. Obama, he does not know how to catch it. The approach has changed; no more dictations but more listening and more recognition of America’s problems around the world, especially in Afghanistan and Iraq. But at the same time there are no concrete results…. What we have is only the first step…. Maybe I am optimistic about Obama, but that does not mean that I am optimistic about other institutions that play negative or paralyzing role[s] to Obama. If you talk about four years, you have one year to learn and the last year to work for the next elections. So, you only have two years. The problem, with these complicated problems around the world, where the United States should play a role to find a solution, is that two years is a very short time…. Is it enough for somebody like Obama?


Hillary Clinton:

Some say that even Hilary Clinton does not support Obama. Some say she still has ambition to be President some day—that is what they say. The press conference of Hillary with [Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin] Netanyahu [in which she appeared to walk away from the Administration’s call for a freeze on settlements] was very bad, even for the image of the United States.


Israel and the United States:

To be biased and side with the Israelis, this is traditional for the United States; we do not expect them to be in the middle soon. So we can deal with this issue, and we can find a way if you want to talk about the peace process. But the vision does not seem to be clear on the U.S. side as to what they really want to happen in the Middle East.


Negotiations with Israel:

I have half a million Palestinians and they have been living here for three generations now. So, if you do not find a solution for them, then what peace you are talking about? What, I said, is the difference between peace and a peace treaty? Peace treaty is what you sign, but peace is when you have normal relations. So, you start with a peace treaty in order to achieve peace…. If they say you can have the entire Golan back, we will have a peace treaty. But they cannot expect me to give them the peace they expect…. You start with the land; you do not start with peace.


The Israelis:

You need a special dictionary for their terms…. They do not have any of the old generation who used to know what politics means, like Rabin and the others. That is why I said they are like children fighting each other, messing with the country; they do not know what to do. [The Israelis] wanted to destroy Hamas in the war [in December, 2008] and make Abu Mazen strong in the West Bank. Actually it is a police state, and they weakened Abu Mazen and made Hamas stronger. Now they wanted to destroy Hamas. But what is the substitute for Hamas? It is Al Qaeda, and they do not have a leader to talk to, to talk about anything. They are not ready to make dialogue. They [Al Qaeda] only want to die in the field.


Europe and the Iranian nuclear negotiation:

This is not European but Bush’s initiative adopted by the Europeans. The Europeans are like the postman; they pretend that they are not like this but they are like a postman; they are completely passive and I told them that. I told the French when I visited France.


Iran:

Imposing sanctions [on Iran] is a problem because they will not stop the program and they will accelerate it if you are suspicious. They can make problems to the Americans more than the other way around. If I am Ahmadinejad, I will not give all the uranium because I do not have a guarantee [in response to American and European insistence that most of Iran’s low-enriched uranium be sent abroad for further enrichment to make it usable for a research reactor, but not for a bomb]…. So, the only solution is that they can send you part and you send it back enriched, and then they send another part…. The only advice I can give to Obama: accept this Iranian proposal because this is very good and very realistic. [Note: the Iranian position appeared to be shifting this week.]


Lebanon:

The civil war in Lebanon could start in days; it does not take weeks or months; it could start just like this. One cannot feel assured about anything in Lebanon unless they change the whole system.


Cooperating with the United States in Iraq:

They [American officials] only talk about the borders; this is a very narrow-minded way. But we said yes. We said yes—and, you know, during Bush we used to say no, but when Mitchell came [as Obama’s envoy] I said O.K.… I told Mitchell by saying this is the first step and when we find something positive from the American side we move to the next level…. We sent our delegation to the borders and [the Iraqis] did not come. Of course, the reason is that [Nouri] al-Maliki [the Prime Minister of Iraq] is against it. So far there is nothing, there is no cooperation about anything and even no real dialogue.


George Mitchell:

I told him, you were successful in Ireland, but this is different…. [Mitchell] is very keen to succeed. And he wants to do something good, but I compare with the situation in the United States: the Congress has not changed…. But the whole atmosphere is not positive towards the President in general. And that is why I think his envoys cannot succeed.


Criticisms of some Israeli policies at the J-Street founding conference:

Ahh … that is new!… But we should educate them that if they are worried about Israel, then the only thing that can protect Israel is peace, nothing else. No amount of airplanes or weapons could protect Israel, so they have to forget about that.


Pakistan’s government:

They supported [Afghan President Hamid] Karzai and realized he cannot deliver. I do not know why they supported him and why—nobody knows why.


American power:

Now the problem is that the United States is weaker, and the whole influential world is weak as well…. You always need power to do politics. Now nobody is doing politics…. So what you need is a strong United States with good politics, not weaker United States. If you have weaker United States, it is not good for the balance of the world.

Wednesday, February 3, 2010

Akbar Zeb not entering Saudi Arabia!

CABLE/ here

Despite having served for years as a distinguished Pakistani diplomat, Akbar Zeb reportedly cannot receive accreditation as Pakistan's ambassador to Saudi Arabia. The reason, apparently, has nothing to do with his credentials, and everything to do with his name -- which, in Arabic,translates to "biggest one-eyed-night-crawler-in-the-turtle-neck-sweater (as per George Carlin)":

In Saudi Arabia, size does count.

A high level Pakistani diplomat has been rejected as Ambassador of Saudi Arabia because his name, Akbar Zib, equates to "Biggest ..." in Arabic. Saudi officials, apparently overwhelmed by the idea of the name, put their foot down and gave the idea of his being posted there, the kibosh.

According to this Arabic-language article in the Arab Times, Pakistan had previously floated Zeb's name as ambassador to the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, only to have him rejected for the same reason. One can only assume that submitting Zeb's name to a number of Arabic-speaking countries is some unique form of punishment designed by the Pakistani Foreign Ministry -- or the result of a particularly egregious cockup.

"... Avatar portrays the occupation ... Israel sits forcefully on lands that belong to others ..."

Israel-avatar
LATimes Blog/ here
"... Mer-Khamis confirmed the incident and added in the newspaper Maariv: "No one dares to make the real analogy. 'Avatar' is one of the bravest films made. It portrays the occupation, but people aren't making the analogy. Many would like to be like the blue people but don't understand the meaning. This is why people got angry at the movie theater. It is no secret that I think the Israelis are occupiers and the Palestinians occupied. Israel sits forcefully on lands that belong to others and this is exactly what the movie is talking about."
Mer-Khamis also suggests distributing the movie in the Palestinian town of Jenin. His choice of Jenin of all Palestinian locations is probably no coincidence: It is home to the Freedom Theatre, which he established a few years ago for the children of the Palestinian refugee camp there and to use "the magic and fantasy of theater to offer some respite" to the population, according to its website.
The Jenin theater was attacked with Molotov cocktails last year. Mer-Khamis was threatened, denounced in leaflets by militant Palestinians as morally corrupt and an agent of Zionism -- probably a first for that allegation. The music center in town was also torched later. Mer-Khamis acknowledged that he was afraid but said that he wasn't the type to run away. "It drives them crazy that a person who's half-Jewish heads one of the most important projects in the northern West Bank," he had told the news media at the time. The Jenin theater was a tribute to his mother, Arna Mer-Khamis, whose earlier work in the town was documented in the film "Arna's Children."
Either way, "Avatar" already got on the wrong side of Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman -- or his spoof, really, on the "Eretz Nehederet" ('It's a Wonderful Country') satire show.
Blowing off claims that his foreign policy had left Israel with no allies in the world, the "minister" introduced the country's new best friend, "an ally out of this world": the prime minister of "Avatar."
The new diplomatic alliance lasts only until the blue thing explains that the movie is about a people resisting occupation.
A leftist movie, sniffs the "minister," and he promptly shoots the blue being.

Sorry, folks, he says. There's isn't going to be an "Avatar No. 2."