Tuesday, February 2, 2010

“Regime-change” in Iran, right now, is more likely to be reflected in a change in the balance of power within the system rather than its replacement.

Tony Karon in the National/ here
".... A regime collapses only when it has become so isolated that its soldiers and police find themselves deployed against their next-door neighbours. In Iran, the regime and its security forces can still count on support from millions of people. Betting on a successful insurrection in Iran right now is just plain daft.

... Iran seems to be in a stalemate where the regime can’t destroy the opposition, but the opposition is unable to topple the regime. “Regime-change” in Iran, right now, is more likely to be reflected in a change in the balance of power within the system rather than its replacement. It’s hard to see how this changes the nuclear equation because the opposition has repeatedly made clear its own rejection of the key western nuclear demand that Iran must end its enrichment of uranium.

Moreover, despite the “regime change” clamour in Washington, it’s not clear that there’s much the US can do to help the Iranian opposition. But leaving the nuclear question up to Iran’s opposition does create political cover for stepping away from a policy of threats and ultimatums that was going nowhere. After all, there may be little prospect of imminent success in stopping Iran’s nuclear programme, but that nuclear programme does not present any imminent threat."

Monday, February 1, 2010

Debka: "US intelligence finds 5,000 Hizballah trained to occupy Galilee ..."

"Toys-R-Us has a similar game..."
If it's not Debka, it's Stratfor or the National Enquirer ...

"Jones was not talking out of the top of his head, but on the strength of solid US intelligence gathered over months on detailed war plans Iran, Syria, Hizballah and Hamas have drawn up to send five Hizballah brigades sweeping across the border to seize five sectors of Galilee, while also organizing a massive Israeli-Arab uprising against the Jewish state. (phew!)
Hamas would open a second front in the south and in the east. Syria is expected to step in at some stage.
This plan with attached special map was first published exclusively by DEBKA-Net-Weekly 430 on Jan. 22, 2010. Key excerpts appear here.....

Jeffrey Feltman dines with walid Jumblat in London ...

Al Akhbar/ here
وقال مقربون من جنبلاط إنه لم يقصد العاصمة البريطانية للقاء فيلتمان، بل كان في زيارة خاصة تتعلق بمتابعة وضع صحي لابنه اصلان، وإن اللقاء مع المسؤول الاميركي رُتّب على أساس وجود الاثنين في بريطانيا. وأوضح المقربون أن جنبلاط شرح لفيلتمان وجهة نظره من السياسة الاميركية في المنطقة، وضرورة إدخال تغييرات جوهرية على الآليات المتبعة لأن الأمور تتغير بقوة على الأرض.
وكان جنبلاط قد أعلن أوائل الخريف أنه يرفض تلبية دعوة الى زيارة واشنطن نقلتها السفيرة ميشال سيسون، لكن أعضاءً في كتلته ولا سيما النائب مروان حمادة دعموا فكرة الزيارة وأنها لا تغيّر شيئاً في موقفه وقراءته الجديدة، وأنها ستظهره أقوى في مواجهة ما يسمّيه هؤلاء «الابتزاز السوري» لجنبلاط وتأخير تحديد موعد استقبال الرئيس السوري بشار الأسد له، ولكن جنبلاط لا يزال يرفض الأمر ويرى أنه لا يفيد في شيء.

Punishing the Jordanians for their anti Iran posturing?

Iraq Jordan Border Iraq Bids You Farewell.jpg
Steve Clemons in
TWN/ here

As Iraq tilts towards March 7th elections, there are disconcerting trends unfolding inside the Maliki-run government that portend serious problems and potentially civil war in the not distant future. Iraq expert and military affairs specialist Tom Ricks recently commented on Wolf Blitzer's Situation Room on CNN that he believed that there was a 50-50 chance Iraq would erupt in civil war, and a 10-15% chance that the growing tensions in and around Iraq could become a regional war involving several of the other major states around Iraq.

Part of the growing trouble inside Iraq stems from the growing sense that politically empowered Shiites in the Iraq Government led by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki are still carrying on campaigns against Sunni political interests.

Recently, more than 500 Sunnis were blacklisted from participating in the coming elections -- many of them former Baathists who have renounced their allegiance to the Ba'ath party and who have declared their loyalty to the Iraq Constitution.

In addition, The Palestine Note has reported and intelligence sources have confirmed to this writer that the Department of Defense is cutting off all supply convoys via the western corridor into Iraq to supply US forces in Iraq. Reportedly, the Iraqi government has stopped providing needed security from its forces along the convoy routes that the suppliers use. Sources with whom I have spoken state that this cutoff of the supply route is designed to punish Sunni Iraqis in Western Iraq and in Jordan, and to punish the Jordanian government for its efforts to check Iran's influence in the region.

The Department of Defense has not at the time of writing responded to calls about this closure of the Jordan-based supply routes.

The suppliers to US forces from Jordan are primarily Sunni-dominant business interests that Prime Minister Maliki and his political and business allies, including Iranian interests, want to squeeze off.

There are approximately 700,000 Iraqi refugees, overwhelmingly Sunni, now residing in Jordan because of violence, targeted kidnappings, and the previous ethnic cleansing and retribution campaigns inside Iraq.

From the Palestine Note:

According to sources inside Jordan, these vital convoys bringing food, fuel, and other supplies from the Hashemite Kingdom to the U.S. forces deployed in Iraq are being terminated effective immediately.

Jordan was the essential route for the lion's share of goods into Iraq which provided goods to the Iraqi people. These goods also gave a commercial and economic injection into the Jordanian economy.

"Is it just a bureaucratic decision by the Pentagon as the war winds down? or Is this decision being driven and influenced by Iraqi PM Maliki and Ahmad Chalabi," said one source who asked to remain anonymous.....

The Department of Defense's action, whether animated or not by Maliki as has been asserted, contribute to a sense that the onramps to Sunni political and economic integration into what Iraq is becoming are being eroded or cut off.

The Kurds seem to be watching with interest -- happy to be supportive if the Iraq political enterprise works and happy to pull back if the Sunnis and Shia ultimately find themselves unable to co-exist....

Those positives aside, some members of the delegation view with great concern the growing tensions between Sunni and Shia parties, the ongoing intervention inside Iraq by countries in the region, and the barring of otherwise legitimate Sunni political leaders who should not be kept out of the process given the criteria all had agreed to.

The Iraq pot seems to be getting back to a boil..."

"Hitting the brick wall in Afghanistan"

Retired Pakistani General, and AfPak expert FB Ali in SST/ here

The United States and its allies appear to be preparing for a significant U-turn in their Afghan policy. When President Obama enunciated his new policy in his West Point speech in November 2009, he announced a big increase in US and ISAF troops there. Their mission would be to turn the war around and hand it over to an Afghan government and army able to continue it in order to achieve full control of their country.

Within a couple of months this policy has hit the ‘brick wall’ of harsh reality, and all the rosy assumptions upon which it was based (many of them deliberately manufactured by the war party) lie in tatters.

The first reality-check was provided by the Afghan elections and their aftermath. They proved that there was no chance of a legitimate, reasonably effective Afghan government emerging to which a handover could take place in two years, as the policy envisaged. This realisation probably led to another, and harder, look at the wildly unrealistic assumptions relating to the setting up of a strong Afghan military able to take over security in the country from foreign troops at the same time. The election left the political strategy of the new policy in tatters.

The success of the new military strategy depended on Pakistan clearing out Taliban insurgents in its tribal areas and establishing control over them (the ‘anvil’ to McChrystal’s ‘hammer’). The Pakistanis have now made it clear (embarrassingly, quite publicly) that they are not prepared to extend their operations to the areas the US wanted them to occupy. (This was predicted in a piece on this website, which went on to warn that, if the US sought to strong-arm Pakistan into taking such action, it would greatly increase the risk of the country being taken over by Islamic nationalists. The US has wisely decided not to try this hazardous tactic). With the Pakistan ‘anvil’ gone, and no viable Afghan army in sight, the rest of the military strategy is now seriously compromised.

Meanwhile, the governments of countries whose soldiers were doing some real fighting (Britain, Canada, and more recently, France) made it clear to Obama that it was not going to be politically feasible for their troops to stay on beyond 2011. All these developments opened up the likely prospect of another Vietnam quagmire, with the generals endlessly pursuing the chimera of victory in an unwinnable war, continuously asking for more time and resources (and threatening to blame him for the defeat if they didn’t get what they wanted).

Other reality checks came closer at home. Obama’s economic advisers probably told him that the war was not economically sustainable beyond next year. His political advisers must have told him that he didn’t have enough political capital left to support the continuation of an unpopular war. The Pentagon probably indicated that keeping up this level of operations in Afghanistan after 2011 would bust the US army. The State Department would have made clear that it wasn’t getting the volunteers it needed to staff the civilian ‘surge’.

Faced with all this harsh reality, it looks as though Obama asked Petraeus and McChrystal whether they could deliver what they’d promised in the next two years with the resources that they had asked for, which he had provided.

Realising that there was no prospect of a blank cheque upon which they could draw in the future, and that the inevitable failure would result in their heads being handed to them on a platter, they appear to have backed off. The best available option then remaining was an indigenous political settlement including the Taliban and other insurgents (this course was advocated as the only realistic solution possible on this website over an year ago, and several times since). This course has now apparently been accepted behind the scenes at the recent London conference, and has in turn led to this sudden change of tune by various generals (wily politicians have either kept their mouths shut, or created verbal smokescreens).

Petraeus: "The concept of reconciliation, of talks between senior Afghan officials and senior Taliban or other insurgent leaders, perhaps involving some Pakistani officials as well, is another possibility."

McChrystal: " As a soldier, my personal feeling is that there’s been enough fighting......... I think any Afghans can play a role if they focus on the future, and not the past," (when asked whether he would be content to see Taliban leaders in a future Afghan government)."


To these blunt admissions they add various caveats regarding weakening the Taliban, and negotiating from a position of strength. These may be just about saving face, or they may be lingering remnants of past illusions. They do not change the basic reality, namely, that a decision has been made to negotiate the best possible deal with the Taliban and other insurgents, thereby allowing for a pullout of US and INSAF troops some time next year. The Pakistan military appears to have been asked to bring the insurgents to the negotiating table, and to lean on them to come to a settlement.

There is, of course, no guarantee that a deal will be struck. The primary condition of the insurgents for entering into negotiations is that foreign troops depart, though they will likely accept a firm (and limited) timetable for this to happen. If the US hedges on the issue, or seeks an extended draw down period, this could scuttle the talks before they even begin. Karzai’s allies from the former Northern Alliance would be opposed to a Taliban return to the corridors of power and they will attempt to abort the exercise (their realization that the US is pulling out will considerably limit the latter’s ability to influence them). Pakistan will influence the insurgents in the direction of its own security interests, and these may not conform to those of the US (or Hamid Karzai’s); they could conceivably even act as a spoiler. Above all, Karzai knows that, for the insurgents, a deal with him would be a temporary arrangement till they could get rid of him. If he thinks he’s not getting sufficient safeguards, he could sabotage the peace process.

The Afghan president Hamid Karzai meets a British soldier injured in Afghanistan.   Photo AFP

But the greatest threat to the prospects of a negotiated settlement could come from ambitious generals with too many troops and no war to win. McChrystal seems to realise this (“You just really don’t make progress, politically, during fighting”) yet he talks about “shaping conditions”. Trying to do this through offensive operations (which other generals are already talking about) would be like sending in a bull to ‘shape’ your china shop before putting it on the market. The US cannot come anywhere near the ‘shaping’ the Russians attempted, but that didn’t save them from having to leave with their tail between their legs.

However events actually play out, it seems fairly certain that the United States will be out of Afghanistan in a couple of years. Sadly, even if a deal is finally struck, the war will still go on for many more months in blighted Afghanistan, and many more men, women and children will needlessly die. On the other hand, if no agreement is reached, the civil war there will go on and on, with neighbouring powers aiding their own proxies. And so even more people will die, or be maimed, or become wandering, hopeless refugees.


And the Great Game will go on

CIA's BIAs (Business Intelligence Advisors)

Politico/ here
"... In one case, these active-duty officers moonlighted at a hedge-fund consulting firm that wanted to tap their expertise in “deception detection,” the highly specialized art of telling when executives may be lying based on clues in a conversation.

A government official familiar with the policy insists it doesn’t impede the CIA’s work on critical national security investigations. This official said CIA officers who want to participate in it must first submit a detailed explanation of the type of work involved and get permission from higher-ups within the agency. “If any officer requests permission for outside employment, those requests are reviewed not just for legality, but for propriety,” CIA spokesman George Little told POLITICO.

But the close ties between active-duty and retired CIA officers at one consulting company show the degree to which CIA-style intelligence gathering techniques have been employed by hedge funds and financial institutions in the global economy.

The firm is called Business Intelligence Advisors, and it is based in Boston. BIA was founded and is staffed by a number of retired CIA officers, and it specializes in the arcane field of “deception detection.” BIA’s clients have included Goldman Sachs and the enormous hedge fund SAC Capital Advisors, according to spokesmen for both firms...."

(more/ here)

LEBANON: Economy grows but reform outlook is poor


OxfAn: Excerpts:
Lebanon is attempting to meet its remaining commitments to the 2007 Paris III aid package. Increased political stability, accompanied by economic reforms, could convince donors to disburse the remaining 3.8 billion dollars of the total 7.6 billion dollars pledged. Such a move would provide the economy with a significant boost and enable the government to write off some of its huge public debt.
ANALYSIS: Lebanese politics ended 2009 on a positive note with the visit to Damascus on December 20 of Prime Minister Saad al-Hariri....This year has started in the same vein: Druze leader Walid Jumblatt, another staunch government critic of Syria, has now moved to what he calls a 'centrist' position, leaving open the possibility that he, too, will achieve reconciliation with Damascus. Since regional reconciliation holds the key to national reconciliation in Lebanon, the thaw between Syria and its enemies in Beirut bodes well for national unity, political reforms and economic progress during 2010. 
Strong recovery. By Lebanese standards, last year was a quiet year. The chief development was the drawn out government formation process, which concluded in November with the election of Hariri to the premiership. The improvement in political stability had a positive effect on the economy, which showed signs of having completed its recovery following the politically disastrous period of 2005-08:
  • Lebanon saw the second highest growth rate in the region after Qatar, with government and World Bank estimates at 7%. The conservative lending strategy of its banks protected it from some of the effects of the global recession. The World Bank estimates that growth will continue at the same rate in 2010.
  • Bank deposits grew by 20% thanks to increased savings from Lebanese nationals living abroad. Foreign exchange reserves also increased to a record level of 28.6 billion dollars. Despite the fact that many Lebanese expatriates lost capital in the downturn, this has been outweighed by the fact that local banks are now seen as a safe haven .
  • Stability boosted tourism. .... the tourist sector thrived on increasing numbers rather than fewer but wealthier visitors from Arab and European countries.
  • The balance of payments recorded a surplus of 12 billion dollars, the highest in recent history.
Debt burden. Lebanon's remarkable ability to prosper amid the global recession has boosted investor confidence, both at home and abroad. Yet the heavy debt burden continues to cloud the outlook: it is now estimated at 51 billion dollars, or 155% of the country's GDP, and is expected to rise by a further 5 billion dollars this year. 
Reform proposals. Inefficiency and corruption are endemic in state institutions and must be addressed if the country is to reduce its debt. Finance Minister Raya Haffar Hassan (let us tell you horror stories from her Ministry!) has vowed to focus public spending in 2010 on a number of key areas:
  • Transport. A high-speed railway has been proposed along the coast to alleviate the heavy environmental costs imposed by road traffic.
  • Education. Modernisation of public education is planned in order to bridge the gap between public and private schools, and to alleviate sectarian divisions among the youth.
  • Power. New power plants are envisaged to alleviate frequent power cuts and reduce high electricity prices.
  • ICT. Improving the efficiency of the information and communications technology (ICT) sector is crucial to facilitate private business activity and attract foreign investment.
Such large public projects are likely to require an increase in Value Added Tax (VAT) (we hear, to 15%)-- a move which could undermine the government's current popularity. On the other hand, these projects will create new jobs and further reduce unemployment, which was down from 18% in 2008 to 10% last year. 

Privatisation prospects. Reform of infrastructure and education are in line with the pledges made to donor states at the Paris III meeting in 2007. So far, only half of the total 7.6 billion dollars pledged to help authorities reduce the public debt, achieve reforms and stimulate the economy, has been disbursed. The remainder is tied to proposals that are still awaiting parliamentary approval, the most important of which involve privatisation. Here the government will find itself in some difficulty:
  • The composite nature of the coalition and deep divisions among ministers threaten to stymie economic reforms.
  • Hizbollah, which holds two ministries, is opposed to privatisation. Its ally, Michel Aoun's Free Patriotic Movement, controls the Telecoms and Energy and Water Ministries, seen as crucial to privatisation efforts.
  • Telecoms Minister Charbel Nahas has expressed concern that selling the entire cellular network to private companies could turn a public monopoly into a private one. However, the current providers will come under scrutiny and be forced to improve their services, which are among the most expensive in the world.
  • Although Lebanon is plagued with an acute power shortage, and the national Electricite du Liban is in poor financial shape, a viable private alternative is still lacking. This suggests that no restructuring of the electricity sector, which accounts for almost half of the national budget, is likely in the short term..."

...Oh, lest we forget: All this because "... there is certainly an element of calming the Israelis as well.”

NYTimes, here
"... But administration officials who spoke on the condition of anonymity said the moves have several aims. “Our first goal is to deter the Iranians,” said one senior administration official. “A second is to reassure the Arab states, so they don’t feel they have to go nuclear themselves. But there is certainly an element of calming the Israelis as well.”

...However, China responds in kind and threatens to slap sanctions on US companies ....

Location, ... Location ... Iran!
CNN/ here
"... China has threatened to slap sanctions on American companies that sell arms to its rival Taiwan as part of a range of punitive actions Beijing is taking to protest the deal.
China also summoned U.S. ambassador Jon Huntsman to express its anger over Washington's announcement, the official Chinese news agency Xinhua said, citing the Foreign Ministry.
Beijing also suspended plans for visits between the Chinese and U.S. militaries and postponed a high-level arms control meeting, it announced Saturday, following Washington's $6.4-billion arms deal with Taiwan...."

Israel kidnaps Lebanese citizen from inside Lebanese territory ... Lebanon does not respond in kind!

ILoubnan/ here
"A joint committee of UNIFIL and Lebanese Army officials inspected on Monday the place where the Lebanese citizen Rabih Zahra was kidnapped Sunday by Israeli forces, National News Agency correspondent reported. The committee later said the kidnapping occurred inside the Lebanese territories and not in any controversial zone.
Zahra, who was released Monday at 2 a.m., said he was, “beaten by the Israelis, questioned about Hezbollah's recent activities, the Lebanese Army and the Palestinians who are present in the region”.

IDF's Deputy Chief of Staff: "...Iran 2010 is the leading threat to Israel's security ..."

EJN (European Jewish News) here
"... One of the highlights of the first night at the Herzliya Conference was the speech carried by Major General Benny Gantz, the Israeli army’s Deputy chief of staff, and the prominent runner-up to take office instead of Gabi Ashkenazi, the current chief of staff....
Iran, according to Gantz, would become in 2010 the leading threat to Israel's security... “We will have the counter response for this challenge”, he said. In a reference to the Goldstone report on the war in Gaza, which he called a “Trojan Horse”, Gantz said that “we should investigate the problematics of the reports on crimes that were allegedly-executed by the IDF soldiers, yet it cannot be a paralyzing process for Israel's stand in front of terrorists.”

Iran is Israel's "problem"...

YNEtnews/ here

"Tzipi Livni claimed in her speech at the Herzliya Conference at the Interdisciplinary Center, "The connection the government has made between the Iranian threat and the end of the conflict with the Palestinians is erroneous and a double mistake."

"The request to the world to help us with Iran so that we can make progress with the Palestinians sends the message that Iran is an Israeli problem, and this is not true. The world must understand that Iran is a problem for the entire international community, and action must be taken against it," claimed Livni.

Jim Jones: ""Our Israeli partners are very responsible..."

Reuters/ here

" ... Jones said the United States and Israel are in close coordination over how to handle Iran. "We have very good dialogue with Israel, continual dialogue," he told The Jerusalem Post. "We're working very closely with them."

Asked whether Washington was concerned about Israel trying to take on its arch-foe alone, Jones said: "Our Israeli partners are very responsible."

Michael Oren, Israel's envoy to the United States, said last month the military option "was not a subject of discussion."....."

With good ties with both Washington and Tehran, Japan emerges as key player on Iran

Politico/ here

"... Japan’s strong relations with both Washington and Iran have also led it to take on a key behind the scenes role in trying to negotiate a possible nuclear fuel swap deal between the West and Iran, regional expert sources said, although there were differing accounts of how promising such efforts have been.

At the same time, the Obama administration has been pushing for Japan to be represented in international diplomatic meetings on Iran, in part as a counterweight to Beijing. China, a permanent member of the UN Security Council and the so called P5+1 group on Iran -- the permanent five members of the UN Security Council plus Germany -- has expressed misgivings about any new international economic sanctions on Iran even before the Taiwan arms sale deal was announced in Washington last week.

Washington Japan hands said a recent effort by Japan to invite Iranian parliament speaker Ali Larijani to Tokyo to discuss a possible nuclear fuel swap deal had been less than promising, while Iran experts said Japan had briefed the Obama administration earlier this month on a possible uranium fuel swap plan that resulted from their consultations with the Iranians.

Under the alleged compromise fuel swap deal that Japanese diplomats quietly briefed U.S. officials on earlier this month, some 70% of Iran’s low enriched uranium stockpile would be moved to Japan, according to what one Washington source, speaking anonymously, was told by the Japanese. Japan would then take responsibility for the stockpile, and ensure the delivery to Iran of fuel rods for nuclear medical use. ....

Getting at least one of the leading Asian powers, China or Japan, on board the international sanctions push was described as a key goal of the Obama administration to help legitimate any further economic sanctions and to make them more effective, a Washington Asia expert said. But Japan's support for such measures is not yet a sure thing, and the Obama administration would see failure to get both China and Japan on board any further Iran sanctions push as a disaster, the Japan expert said...

Beyond its good ties with both Washington and Iran and diplomatic discretion, other factors elevate Japan’s role on the Iran issue. Japan is currently a year into a two-year term as one of the 10 non-permanent members of the UN Security Council, .......Japan also walked back from a military nuclear program, while having an extensive nuclear energy program. It was also of course the only nation ever attacked with nuclear weapons.

In addition, in November, a Japanese diplomat, Yukio Amano, succeeded Mohamed ElBaradei to become director general of the IAEA, in effect the top international nuclear negotiator in the world. Over the weekend in Davos, Amano made his first public comments on the Iran IAEA negotiations since assuming the job late last year. "Our proposal is on the table,” Amano told journalists at the World Economic Forum in Switzerland. “Dialogue is continuing.”