Wednesday, September 16, 2009

Obama's 'metrics for Afghanistan & Pakistan' [text]

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"...The overarching goal of U.S. policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan is "to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qa'ida in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent their return to either country in the future," the draft metrics document says.

But Fred Kagan, a fellow at the American Enterprise Institute who has advised General McChrystal but was not speaking on his behalf, said in a talk last week that the Obama administration had made a mistake early on in putting too much rhetorical emphasis on al Qaeda. "The reason to be in Afghanistan is not to be fighting al Qaeda in Afghanistan," he said. "This is a two-front war on both sides of the Durand Line."

Speaking in The Hague last Friday, General McChrystal told reporters, "I do not see indications of a large al Qaeda presence in Afghanistan now." But he added that al Qaeda commanders do retain their contacts with insurgents in the country."

FP/ Cable

The goal of the United States is to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qa'ida in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent their return to either country in the future.

Background: During his March 27, 2009 speech announcing our new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, President Obama said "going forward, we will not blindly stay the course. Instead, we will set clear metrics to measure progress and hold ourselves accountable." This paper outlines a process to fulfill that directive. The intent is to use this assessment process to highlight both positive and negative trends and issues that may call for policy adjustments over time.

Agreed Metrics:  The supporting objectives of the Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy form the framework for evaluating progress. The indicators within each of the objectives represent a mix of quantitative and qualitative measures, intended to capture objective and subjective assessments.

Common Baseline: The ODNI provided a baseline assessment of the metrics on July 17, 2009 from which progress will be measured; this is our common start point.

Process: By March 30, 2010 and on regular intervals thereafter, the interagency will draft an assessment of progress in Afghanistan and Pakistan. As a check and balance on the interagency, a separate assessment will also be produced by a Red Team, led by the National Intelligence Council.

Objective 1. Disrupt terrorist networks in Afghanistan and especially Pakistan to degrade any ability they have to plan and launch international terrorist attacks.

Metrics: Please see the attached classified annex.

Objective 2a. Assist efforts to enhance civilian control and stable constitutional government in Pakistan.

Metrics:

  1. Progress towards Pakistan's civilian government and judicial system becoming stable and free of military involvement
  2. Pakistan's actions to take necessary steps to ensure economic and financial stability, job creation, and growth
  3. Support for human rights
  4. Development of an enduring, strategic partnership between the U.S. and Pakistan
  5. Pakistani public opinion of government performance
  6. Demonstrable action by government against corruption, resulting in incrwased trust and confidence of the Pakistani public

Objective 2b. Develop Pakistan's counterinsurgency (COIN) capabilities; continue to support Pakistan's efforts to defeat terrorist and insurgent groups.

Metrics:

  1. Effectiveness of Pakistani civilian, intelligence and military in conducting counterinsurgency operations across the clear-hold-build phases to defeat insurgent groups
  2. Level of militant-initiated violence
  3. Extent of militant-controlled areas in Pakistan
  4. Effectiveness of Pakistani border security efforts

Objective 2c. Involve the international community more actively to forge an international consensus to stabilize Pakistan.

Metrics:

  1. Effectiveness of security, governance, and development assistance
  2. Support from allies, international organizations, and other key players, including China, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and UAE
  3. Coordination of international efforts by the U.N.
  4. Status of relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan
  5. Pakistani policies and resources committed to maintaining international support

Objective 3a. Defeat the extremist insurgency, secure the Afghan populace, and develop increasingly self-reliant Afghan security forces that can lead the counterinsurgency and counterterrorism fight with reduced U.S. assistance.

Metrics:

  1. Degree to which security operations are integrated into the overall COIN campaign
  2. Level of insurgent-related violence
  3. Public perceptions of security
  4. Percent of population living in districts/areas under insurgent control
  5. Percent of population living in districts/areas undergoing clearing operations
  6. Percent of populations living in districts/areas "held" by coalition and/or ANSF and where "build" activities are ongoing
  7. Percent of key lines of communication under government control
  8. Effectiveness of Afghan border security efforts
  9. Level of trust and confidence by the Afghan people in the ANSF's (Army and Police) ability to provide sustained security
  10. Capability, to include size, of the ANA and ANP
  11. Effectiveness of ANSF-ISAF partnered counterinsurgency operations
  12. Ability of the ANSF to assume lead security responsibility
  13. Level of corruption within the ANSF
  14. Ability of the ANSF to handle their own logistics needs

Objective 3b. Promote a more capable, accountable, and effective government in Afghanistan that serves the Afghan people and can eventually function, especially regarding internal security, with limited international support.

Metrics:

  1. Afghan Government's institutions at the national, provincial, and local level, including ability to hold credible elections in 2009 and 2010
  2. Effectiveness of the Afghan Government in collecting revenues (both in absolute terms and as a percentage of budget requirements) and executing its budget at the national, provincial, and local levels
  3. Public perception of Afghanistan's justice sector and commitment to providing the rule of law at the national, provincial, and local levels
  4. Demonstrable action by the government against corruption, resulting in increased trust and confidence of the Afghan public
  5. Support for human rights
  6. Public perception at the district level of the Afghan Government's effectiveness and sustained ability to provide services
  7. Afghanistan's economic stability and development with emphasis on agriculture
  8. Volume and value of narcotics
  9. Successful interdiction and prosecution of high-profile (see Karzai frere) narco-traffickers
  10. Afghan Government's efforts to develop and execute reconciliation programs at the national, provincial, and local levels with U.S. and international support

Objective 3c. Involve the international community more actively to forge an international consensus to stabilize Afghanistan.

Metrics:

  1. Support from allies, international organizations, and other key regional countries in providing resources to Afghanistan
  2. Prospects for the Afghan Government and international community to fund the development, operations, and sustainment of the ANSF
  3. Effectiveness of international security, governance, and development assistance
  4. Establishment of accounting and management controls for UN coordination of international efforts
  5. Ability of NGOs to operate independently and freely
  6. Status of relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan
  7. Status of relations between Afghanistan and its other neighbors

Mitchell extends trip to Friday

"U.S. Middle East peace envoy George Mitchell has extended his trip to the region until Friday.

Negotiations continue between him and Netanyahu to see if they can reach an agreement on some sort of settlement freeze. Such an agreement is one key element needed to make way for the announcement of a relaunch of peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians.

It has been anticipated that Netanyahu, Abbas and President Barack Obama would hold a trilateral meeting on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly opening session events in New York next week. ......An Israeli official told POLITICO today that he thinks the meeting itself is likely to take place, but that an announcement of a peace talks relaunch could possibly take another couple weeks...'


'Secret' Iranian missile memos


Very interesting story flagged on ArmsControlWonks on 'secret' Iranian missile memos, here

" .... The memos cover, in a somewhat sketchy way, a lot of ground. Perhaps the most important aspects are those that deal with how several countries collaborate in either developing missiles or selling missile technology to Iran. The memos use codes for the different collaborator countries but I think I know the meanings of the codes. If my understanding is correct, they indicate that representatives from North Korea and China have been present at all phases of production and flight testing. Iran has also gotten important help from Russia, though Russians do not appear to have been as ubiquitous as the Chinese and the North Koreans. The evidence from the memos indicates that this help is on the governmental level rather than “rogue” individuals. This includes Russian help though Russia has been particularly vocal in its denials of such assistance. Despite these denials, the evidence of foreign assistance, both images of engines and turbopumps that are obviously of Russian origin—either their actual production or at the very least their designs—and these internal Iranian memos, make the case overwhelmingly.

The strong implication in the memos is that this assistance was sought by Iran to reduce the risk of project failure. However, the exchange of technology is not automatic, as it would be in a shared development program. Iran appears to have decided that it will try to solve problems as they come up in an effort to develop indigenous capabilities. Under this acquisition strategy, transfer of technology or know-how, even the exchange of opinions, must be approved on what appears to be a case by case basis by a central authority. This could be an explanation for why North Korea’s U’nha-2 failed during its third stage even though it appears to use the Safir’s second stage; a stage that Iran had problems with but eventually got to work. The solution to that problem under this type of collaboration would not have automatically been shared and either North Korea did not ask for it or Iran refused to share it.

Several of the memos also highlight one area that Iran says it does need help in: the production of advanced solid and liquid propellant. They say that while Iran has tried to produce such fuels on its own, they indicate that the problems they have run into are best solved to purchasing complete propellant production plants from outside sources.

These memos have, at least for me, put Iran’s missile development strategy in a different light. Iran is clearly mustering its industrial and intellectual infrastructure to produce long range missiles and, more importantly, to assimilate the know-how to design and produce more advanced missiles in the future. It is not, however, doing this independently of more advanced nations. In fact, it still needs to rely on them for help in quickly solving problems as they come up and for purchasing complete production facilities if they find a process too hard for efficient indigenous production. But Iran is picking and choosing, in a strategic fashion, the problems it wants to solve on its own and those it wants help with. All of this is done in a concerted effort to become an independent designer and manufacturer of long range missiles in as short a time as possible...."

Parties bargain ahead of peace talks

"Like its predecessors in trying to solve the vexing riddle of Middle East peace, the Obama administration has sought to manage expectations for progress. 
But despite the best efforts of Washington, parties on all sides of the conflict now anticipate an early moment of truth for the young administration: the possibility that President Barack Obama, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas will announce an agreement next week, on the sidelines of the U.N. General Assembly meeting, to relaunch Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations. 
With that virtual deadline in mind, and Obama’s Middle East envoy, George Mitchell, on a last-ditch trip to the region to try to secure Netanyahu’s commitment to some sort of settlement freeze, all parties appear to be digging in and trying to bargain as hard as possible, including for the benefit of their domestic political situations. 

But interviews with sources from the region and in the U.S. in recent days suggest that the parties, while staking out tough positions in the final days, do not want to see the process collapse or the expected New York “triangle” meeting not be held. They are bargaining hard — playing a game of chicken, as one expert described it — with an eye toward ultimately showing up and with the expectation that relaunched peace negotiations will get under way, numerous sources say.....
In an effort to lower expectations and perhaps engage in its own negotiating gambit, the White House insists that it is not wedded to a peace talks relaunch announcement next week and that such expectations are artificial. “There is no meeting in the books,” a White House official said on condition of anonymity. “The UNGA target [came about] because it was convenient: [The leaders] were all going to be in the same city. It was never a hard deadline.” 

An Israeli official told POLITICO on Tuesday that Netanyahu and Mitchell are likely to compromise on a nine-month freeze of Jewish settlement construction in the West Bank. The official suggested Netanyahu may be arguing about what happens at the end of that period — whether he can go to Bush-era understandings on natural settlement growth, apparently not agreed to by the Obama administration. 
Netanyahu has also publicly insisted that East Jerusalem not be considered part of any settlement freeze, .......Netanyahu is currently expected to be in New York for the UNGA only on Sept. 23 and 24, the Israeli official said. He said the expectation on the Israeli side is that there would be a trilateral meeting involving Obama, Netanyahu and Abbas at the Waldorf Astoria, where the State Department has a suite on the 27th floor, on one of those days. 

Obama will announce that the U.S., with the Israelis and Palestinians, has arrived at a formula to reopen negotiations, the Israeli official suggested. Obama may also announce some general parameters of such negotiations — that they will be based on a two-state solution and adhere to the so-called road map. He may also offer a very general timetable without overly committing himself, the official said.....
Also being discussed is enlisting Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak to make an announcement around the time Israeli-Palestinian peace talks relaunch. That statement would indicate the commitment for some Arab states to show goodwill and steps toward normalization with Israel for the duration that it commits to freeze settlements and engages in peace talks toward establishing a Palestinian state."

Dennis Ross remains optimistic on Mideast talks

I bet we can all name the party that'll "...NOT get what they want".
Politico's Ben Smith, here
"At a complicated moment between the U.S. and Israel, top administration officials including David Axelrod, Valerie Jarrett, Josh DuBois, and Dennis Ross met the leadership of the Orthodox Union, which represents Orthodox Jewish congregations, at the White House this morning. 
Ross was pushed on the question of settlements. His response, as relayed by one attendee: 
"The logic was to create an environment to get into negotiations; we need to get into negotiations; we will wrap up these discussions and not everyone will get what they want, but all will get something."

Tuesday, September 15, 2009

... how can Israel go to war again?

Aluf Benn, Haaretz, here
"... If its findings and recommendations are accepted, the International Criminal Court in The Hague could call a summit meeting between the leaders of Israel, Hamas and the Palestinian Authority on the defendants' stand. 
But the ultimate adjudicator on the report's fate will be Barack Obama, who now has another whip with which to flay Benjamin Netanyahu - if you don't freeze the settlements and agree to concessions, legal proceedings will commence against those responsible for Operation Cast Lead. 
It's doubtful that Obama wishes to make such a threat, which would set a precedent against other militaries fighting terror in civilian areas, as is the U.S. army in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
The report brings up a number of findings. First, then-prime minister Ariel Sharon erred in 2005 in not seeing the Gaza disengagement to its conclusion by asking the international community for recognition that the occupation of Gaza had ended. A significant portion of the crimes for which Israel is now blamed stemmed from its humanitarian responsibility for the residents of the Strip. 
Second, Ehud Olmert and Ehud Barak (prime and defense ministers respectively during Cast Lead) erred in ignoring the Gazan population's suffering, and in allowing the death and destruction the IDF perpetrated during the Gaza campaign. 
Lengthening the operation and choosing to send in ground forces - decisions which won widespread support among the Israeli public - wrought untold damage to Israel's international image, and bolstered the legitimacy of Hamas. 
Third, Western governments may ignore this damning report, but it will now serve as the basis of criticism against Israel in public opinion, the media, on campuses and in think tanks, places where UN documents are still taken seriously. 
Fourth, Israel decided to question the investigators' legitimacy and not cooperate with commission chair Richard Goldstone and his team. None of the defenses heard in Israeli media after the Gaza operation - that the IDF is "the most moral army in the world," that striking civilian-populated areas was necessary and proportional - were reported to the commission. To a university student in Britain or Spain, Israel's silence is perceived as an admission of guilt. 
The appearance of Israeli "private citizens" before the panel proved its usefulness: Noam Shalit testified, and then Goldstone called for the release and return of his son. 
Maybe it would have been better if the government had behaved as Shalit did, flooding Goldstone with information? 
Last, and perhaps most important, the Goldstone report reinforces the most serious strategic threat Israel brought upon itself with the Gaza offensive, in that it saps international legitimacy for a similar operation in the future. 
A country considering attacking the nuclear reactor in Iran, and then endangering itself to rocket fire from Lebanon and Gaza in response, will have to take into account whether the world will give Israel another opportunity for a severe, crushing response. 

Obama Is Pushing Israel Toward War

Just like Bush pushed Israel to dismember Lebanon in 2006'? ....Israel, the Peace loving nation ... Israel want American men and women to die just as they did in Iraq on its behalf!
In the WSJ, here

" ... What's an American president to do in the face of this nonstarter of a document? What else, but pretend it isn't a nonstarter. Talks begin Oct. 1.....

In sum, the conclusion among Israelis is that the Obama administration won't lift a finger to stop Iran, much less will the "international community." So Israel has pursued a different strategy, in effect seeking to goad the U.S. into stopping, or at least delaying, an Israeli attack by imposing stiff sanctions and perhaps even launching military strikes of its own.

Thus, unlike Israel's air strike against Iraq's reactor in 1981 or Syria's in 2007, both of which were planned in the utmost secrecy, the Israelis have gone out of their way to advertise their fears, purposes and capabilities. They have sent warships through the Suez Canal in broad daylight and conducted widely publicized air-combat exercises at long range. They have also been unusually forthcoming in their briefings with reporters, expressing confidence at every turn that Israel can get the job done.

The problem, however, is that the administration isn't taking the bait, and one has to wonder why. Perhaps it thinks its diplomacy will work, or that it has the luxury of time, or that it can talk the Israelis out of attacking. Alternatively, it might actually want Israel to attack without inviting the perception that it has colluded with it. Or maybe it isn't really paying attention...."

"Saad is not ready to govern us..... he doesn’t have the strength to unify us ...."


DailyStar, here

" ... Saad Hariri responded in a statement on Sunday that any parties refusing to support his re-designation would, in turn, be left out of plans to form the new unity government. 
“Hariri hopes that by getting re-appointed he can strengthen his position to force the opposition to accept his proposals for a unity government,” said Ahmad, a 57-year-old shoe polisher on the streets of Beirut. “We lost our country when we lost [former Premier]Rafik Hariri. His son Saad is not ready to govern us. Every party is pulling the country in different directions and Hariri doesn’t have the strength to unify us.” 
Many people on the bustling streets of Beirut share in Ahmad’s pessimism. .... 

Ali, a 29-year-old Hizbullah supporter believes that “the March 14 alliance are not convinced by Hariri’s leadership and he must sort out the internal divisions between the Christian parties before he is able to successfully form a unified government coalition. 
“Hariri has shown great weakness, unlike his father, and has not received the international support he desired to force the hands of the other political powers,” Ali added. He concluded: “Lebanon cannot be run by one color.” 

Imad, a 52-year-old Future Movement supporter was less critical of Hariri. “His resignation is a strategic move (laughter) designed to strengthen his position, he wants to form a strong government and retain the share of power. He believes this is his right according to the Taif Accord,” he said. 
Imad warned that Lebanon was in danger of another civil war “unless the factions can unite,” adding: “Hariri needs to find the strength to form a government that pleases the majority, yet still retains the power for the March 14 alliance. Saudi Arabia and Syria are at a standstill and this needs to be broken for the sake of Lebanese independence.” 

Jumblatt says Iran can supply nation's weapons

Lebanon-jumblatt
LATimes, here

" ...That's OK, says Walid Jumblatt. If the United States fails to provide Lebanon with such weapons, it could turn to the Islamic Republic, which already is believed to supply weapons to Hezbollah, the Lebanese Shiite political organization and militia.

"Until now all the weapons delivered to the Lebanese army were American weapons or weapons from the Arab world," Jumblatt said. "We need anti-tank weapons and anti-aircraft weapons... I think we can find such weapons in Iran or in Russia or in China."

Just a little while ago, Jumblatt was the darling of American conservatives, feted during visits to Washington during the Bush years, when he was a staunch member of Lebanon's U.S.-backed March 14 alliance of political parties..."

Hamid Karzai's brother: a snitch for U.S. intelligence...


CQ's Spytalk, here
"Evidently taking a page from the Boston Irish mob - and countless crooks before him - Afghan President Hamid Karzai's younger brother has become a snitch for U.S. intelligence, according to an allegation buried deep in a Washington Post story Monday. 
If true, the connection with U.S. intelligence would go a long way to explaining why Ahmed Wali Karzai, the most powerful official in Afghanistan's volatile Kandahar Province, remains free despite a widespread consensus that he is one of Afghanistan's major drug kingpins.
The U.S. intelligence connection to the president's brother popped up in the 24th paragraph of a dispatch from Kabul Monday from The Washington Post's estimable Rajiv Chandrasekaran. 
Several U.S. lawmakers, including Vice President Biden when he was chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, have urged the president to dismiss his brother from the [Kandahar Province] council," which he chairs, Chandrasekaran wrote.
"But U.S. and Canadian diplomats have not pressed the matter, in part because Ahmed Wali Karzai has given valuable intelligence to the U.S. military, and he also routinely provides assistance to Canadian forces, according to several officials familiar with the issue."
The CIA declined to comment on the allegation.............The U.S. Central Command did not immediately respond to a request for comment..............A responsible Canadian official could not be reached for comment....
The provincial capital, according to Chandrasekaran's report, threatens to fall to the Taliban, largely because of official corruption.    And Ahmed Wali Karzai, the president's brother, is the city's top gangster, according to multiple reliable reports in recent years."